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ABSTRACT 
The Navy has mandated that fielded computer systems be network-centric, service-based, 
and support open architectures. However, this competency is limited by network 
resources—namely radio frequency bandwidth—which the Navy has at its disposal. This 
forces decisions to be made in which some network applications take priority over others. 
We apply the Capabilities-based Competency Assessment process developed by Suttie 
and Potter to create a prioritization model for this problem of limited bandwidth. DoD 
Architectural Framework Version 1.5 products are used to construct an architectural 
description for a carrier strike-group underway, capturing each of the operational nodes 
working within an air detect-to-engage scenario. By linking the tasking assigned to each 
of these nodes and the services required for their completion, resources may be aligned to 
support warfare commander’s intent and develop a prioritization which optimizes 
network performance for this tasking. Through network simulation, a comparison is made 
between the proposed prioritization scheme and traditional schemes. Results show our 
prioritization scheme consistently reduced latency and increased throughput for mission 
relevant applications. These improvements translate directly to more relevant information 
getting to decision makers at a quickened pace. Such information richness leads to 
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The United States Navy has put forth a mandate for fielded computer systems to 
be network-centric, service-based, and support open architectures. The purpose for this 
move is to gain an increase in combat effectiveness through the networking of the 
warfighter while at the same time building in the flexibility to easily modify and expand 
the existing network architecture. By leveraging this capability, the Navy can field a 
rapid, adaptable, war-fighting network, easily tailored to the task at hand. However, this 
competency is still limited by the network resources—namely radio frequency (RF) 
communications systems bandwidth—which the Navy has at its disposal (PEO C4I, 
2011). This limitation of resources forces decisions to be made in which some network 
applications must take priority over others. This decision-making requirement led to the 
two questions around which this report is focused:  
1) What is the feasibility of developing a bandwidth utilization priority scheme 
based upon identified tasks and information required by warfighters to conduct 
military operations within a hostile environment? 
2) How will this systematic allocation process, based upon warfighter information 
needs and dynamically tailored for various threats, affect data latency and 
information throughput? 
In order to correctly prioritize Navy tactical networks to meet the need of the 
warfighter, we must leverage network Quality of Service (QoS) provisions tailored to 
DoD needs. Managing QoS allows system administrators to tailor network resources and 
prioritization to match what the user needs. The Navy currently deploys the Automated 
Digital Network System (ADNS) – Increment III to manage the transmission and 
prioritization of Internet Protocol (IP) – based network traffic. While ADNS does 
implement QoS management, it was not designed with the needs of the warfighter as its 
primary focus nor does it provide the capability to dynamically manage network priority 
based on changing threats.  
We propose to optimize warfighter abilities by matching network system 
priorities to the prioritization of the tasks required to accomplish the overarching warfare 
capability. Central to our approach is an understanding of how the U.S. Navy wages war 
 xviii 
at sea. Our process leverages current surface warfare doctrine and encompasses the 
Composite Warfare Concept (CWC) employed by surface units operating at sea. We use 
a carrier strike group (CSG) to illustrate our process as the CSG is and will continue to be 
the cornerstone of U.S. Naval strategy. Air defense operations being carried out by the 
CSG are used because few other warfare areas pose the unique challenges of sea-based 
air defense—perhaps chief among them being the need for rapid, networked response.  
This study follows the Capability-Based Competency Assessment approach 
developed by Suttie & Potter (2008), to identify Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs). 
The METLs are used to identify a set of competencies which incorporate operations, 
personnel, and system requirement inherent to air defense operations. We start by using 
the Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF) Version 1.5 products to 
capture the roles and responsibilities of each of the individuals who make up a ship’s air 
defense team. These individuals act as operational nodes upon which the strike group’s 
functional architecture is built. An Organizational Relationships Chart (OV-4) is used to 
clarify these roles and to clearly delineate the operational hierarchy. Next, we use an 
Operational Node Connectivity (OV-2) diagram to capture the actual structure of those 
individuals working within the strike group. The OV-2 shows the lines of communication 
and information flow between each of the operational nodes. Each of these operational 
nodes is assigned tasking which, when completed, aggregate to complete the overarching 
task of executing air defense operations.  
This tasking is identified using the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL). The 
UNTL serves as a repository for tasks that can be completed by Naval forces. These tasks 
are considered essential for mission accomplishment (Chief of Naval Operations, 
Commandant, United States Marine Corp, Commandant, United States Coast Guard, 
2007). By parsing this list of mission capabilities and identifying the relevant mission 
tasks, we develop the METLs suggested by Suttie and Potter and prioritize tasks based on 
their relevance to the mission at hand. Using an Operational Activity Model (OV-5), each 
of these tasks is assigned to the operational node responsible for their completion and 
their relevance to one another is made clear. Next, we seek to identify those network 
systems which are relevant to this mission tasking. 
 xix 
The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) 
Masterplan serves to summarize the major attributes of DoN network-centric systems. It 
provides baseline descriptions of the networked systems fielded by the Navy and 
identifies the platforms to which they are assigned (PEO C4I, 2011). Using the system 
descriptions presented in the C4I Masterplan, a list is developed of those systems 
required to conduct air defense operations. By using a System Functionality Description 
(SV-4a) viewpoint it is possible to break down each of the relevant, net-centric systems 
and identify their provided functionality. The relationships between those systems are 
mapped, thus providing the structure of the viewpoint. 
The DoD guidance on Architectural Framework Version 1.5, volume II, defines 
an Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5a) as documenting 
the relationship between the operational activities and system functionality present in the 
overall architecture. It is this relationship that is most beneficial for the purpose of this 
thesis. By linking the operational nodes which are passing information to the 
corresponding data relationships captured by a SV-5a, the form of the service-oriented 
architecture takes place. The resulting prioritization scheme aligns operational nodes and 
services within the overall system architecture so that commanders are able to more 
effectively use existing network resources to accomplish required tasks within a 
compressed time frame. By linking the identified systems to the application types ADNS 
recognizes, we have provided mission specific justification for the prioritization of one 
network application over another, thus answering to the first of our two questions.  
To answer the second question, we developed a simulation model that captures 
the current Navy data processing environment. The model is used to compare our 
prioritization scheme to current network prioritization templates in the context of an air 
detect-to-engage scenario. The results show that our prioritization scheme consistently 
reduced latency and increased throughput for mission relevant network applications as 
compared to current network prioritization schemes. These improvements were both 




translate directly to more relevant information getting to decision makers at a quickened 
pace. Such information richness leads to “information dominance,” ultimately providing 
superior warfighting capability. 
The steps developed in this thesis are designed to be used by tactical commanders 
during the planning process prior to a strike group’s workups. This thesis provides a 
detailed architectural model which may be used to align warfare commander’s priority 
and intent with existing network capabilities and provides a common tool for 
communicating warfare commander’s intent to those responsible for carrying out that 
intent. This approach should be used to help Navy networks achieve the warfighting 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence (PEO C4I) Masterplan serves as a repository of information 
for all Navy and many Joint network-centric applications (PEO C4I, 2011). It acts to 
summarize the major programs of the Department of the Navy (DoN) as applicable to 
network operations, providing outlines of planned future capabilities, their major 
characteristics, and timelines for their implementation. The main purpose of this 
documentation is to “improve the unified focus across the PEO C4I enterprise in order to 
provide Navy and Joint warfighters with the best network-centric information dominance 
capabilities that fully support their missions” (PEO C4I, 2011).  
To support this focus, the PEO C4I Masterplan has put forth a mandate for fielded 
computer systems to be network-centric, service-based, and support open architectures. 
The purpose for this move is to gain an increase in combat effectiveness through the 
networking of the warfighter while at the same time building in the flexibility to easily 
modify and expand the existing network architecture. By leveraging this capability, the 
Navy can field a rapid, adaptable war-fighting network, easily tailored to the task at hand. 
However, this competency is still limited by the network resources—namely radio 
frequency (RF) communications systems bandwidth—which the Navy has at its disposal 
(PEO C4I, 2011). This limitation of resources forces decisions to be made in which some 
network applications must take priority over others. This suggests two research questions 
that will be explored in this thesis:  (1) “What is the feasibility of developing a bandwidth 
utilization priority scheme based upon identified tasks and information required by 
warfighters to conduct military operations within a hostile environment? And (2) “How 
will this systematic allocation process, based upon warfighter information needs and 
dynamically tailored for various threats, affect data latency and information throughput?”   
To answer the research questions we must first gain an understanding of the needs 
of the warfighter—the thought processes and the tactics used in the battlefield. The 
centerpiece for U.S. Naval strategy is the carrier strike group (CSG). The carriers 
themselves are dynamic platforms equipped with a wide variety of assets which may be 
 2 
used both tactically in war as well as for more peaceful missions. These assets are 
coupled with escort vessels equipped with the best and most modern sensors and 
weapons fielded for battle at sea, each of them manned by technically proficient crews 
capable of not only naval combat but also disaster relief. This inherent flexibility makes 
the aircraft carrier not only suited for war but also as an instrument for peace. Any naval 
network prioritization scheme designed without taking the needs and the operating 
practices of the CSG into account will have been developed in vain. It is also critical that 
we define the doctrine the Navy uses to provide command and control at sea. Using this 
doctrine as our foundation, we can build the framework for our prioritization scheme by 
capturing the operational relationships and functional architecture of both the systems 
and the operators working within the CSG. 
The Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF) is the guiding 
document for the development of such functional architectures. It provides a standardized 
format and set of rules for the representation and comparison of DoD architectures (DoD, 
2007). This guidance continues to evolve as the definitions of what comprises 
architecture develop and as the DoD makes moves to encompass NCW. DoDAF Version 
1.5 has been uniquely tailored to the needs of the net-centric environment.1 It has as its 
focus those net-centric concepts that are shaping the way the DoD wages war and it 
allows for the development of architectural artifacts which describe mission operations 
and processes and those operational activities responsible for their completion (DoD, 
2007). Additionally, DoDAF Version 1.5 encompasses those systems utilized by 
identified operational activities to complete mission tasking. The benefit of using DoDAF 
to represent the CSG is that it provides a succinct representation of the operators and 
systems working within its architectural framework. It captures the relationships between 
the system operators working in this environment and allows an observer to understand 
 
 
                                                 
1 Although DoDAF Version 2.0 has been published, it defines systems as encompassing not only 
hardware and software but also those non-machine components, i.e., human operators, with which the 
system interacts (DoD, 2009). The nature of the approach to be defined in this paper requires specific 
delineation between computer systems and the operators which use them. For this reason, DoDAF Version 
1.5 will be used for all architectural descriptions. 
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the information relationships required to complete operational tasking. Once these 
relationships have been correctly identified, it is then possible to develop a methodology 
for their correct prioritization. 
Having gained an understanding of how the Navy makes war, it is then critical to 
comprehend the methods and technologies implemented to manage its tactical networks. 
The Navy currently deploys the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS)–Increment 
III to manage the transmission and prioritization of Internet Protocol (IP)–based network 
traffic. The ADNS and Tactical Networks Program offices have fielded documentation 
which describes the usage of ADNS and how it manages network behavior (Automated 
Digital Network System, 2011). This document describes the process by which ADNS 
marks network traffic, based on class discrimination, and the queuing behavior by which 
it prioritizes the traffic which it transmits. The current network prioritization scheme 
implemented on ADNS does not rank applications based on their use by the warfighter in 
a combat environment but rather seeks to optimize network performance based on 
application characteristics. While this approach may work for a civilian, bandwidth rich 
environment, it does not fully support the main purpose of Navy tactical networks, i.e., 
war fighting. 
In order to correctly prioritize Navy tactical networks to meet the need of the 
warfighter, we must leverage network Quality of Service (QoS) provisions tailored to 
DoD needs. The PEO C4I Masterplan defines QoS as “the ability to provide different 
priority to different applications, users, or data flows, or to guarantee a certain level of 
performance to a data flow” (PEO C4I, 2011). Managing QoS allows system 
administrators to tailor network resources and prioritization to match what the user needs. 
The need for network QoS management was born from the increasing diversity and 
capability of modern computer networks. As more and different network applications 
have been developed, the need to manage their different network resource requirements 
has evolved. As the robustness of these applications increases, so too must the ability to 
manage them. While ADNS does implement QoS management, it was not designed with 
the needs of the warfighter as its primary focus nor does it provide the capability to 
dynamically manage network priority based on changing threats. Therefore, it is prudent 
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to consider additional QoS management approaches. There are two generally accepted 
methods of implementing network QoS management: Integrated Services and 
Differentiated Services. 
A. INTEGRATED SERVICES 
Integrated Services (IntServ) works by providing bandwidth guarantees to 
network applications, given that the routers between the source and destination 
applications support IntServ capability (White, 1997). This is opposed to “best-effort” 
traffic flows which receive no guarantee and will only be provided those network 
resources that are available. This “reservation” of network resources is accomplished by 
network management or via the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) network protocol 
in which each network router works to request the needed network resources prior to 
transmission (White, 1997). Assuming the network request is accepted, the required 
network resources are reserved for the session between the applications requesting the 
bandwidth commitments.  
Wang et al. (2004) have proposed an IntServ technique utilizing the 
publish/subscribe style. Their proposal requires service requesters to develop and 
transmit QoS messages (utilizing an Extensible Markup Language (XML) based QoS 
language) to network service providers. XML is a “user-friendly” computer language 
designed to be readable by both the machines running the instructions and the humans 
controlling those machines. These messages are used to define the requested QoS 
characteristics and to develop QoS contracts which are used to parse out available 
network resources to the requesting application. Their approach utilizes ten separate 
network services to implement, monitor, and manage network QoS at the middleware 
layer (Wang et al., 2004)—middleware layer being software designed to provide 
resources to applications separate from that which the operating system provides. They 
demonstrated through experimentation the effectiveness of their technique in reducing 
end-to-end delays and the provision of responsive QoS to varied client requirements. 
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Integrated services are somewhat difficult to implement and, as a result, limited 
research has been conducted regarding its implementation in QoS management; 
nevertheless it should be recognized as a potential solution for tailoring DoD QoS 
implementation. 
B. DIFFERENTIATED SERVICE 
The Differentiated Services (DiffServ) model works by taking advantage of the 
Type of Service (TOS) byte within the Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) header (Xiao & 
Ni, 1999). By manipulating three bits within this byte, applications may specify 
requirements for the handling of their associated data. Like type services may be grouped 
together and a set of rules derived for the handling of each particular data type—also 
known as an aggregate class. Although DiffServ is not as readily tailored to specific 
network applications as IntServ, its generality makes it far easier to implement and, as a 
result, it has a much wider application as a QoS management tool in networks (Xiao & 
Ni, 1999). One disadvantage to DiffServ is that it is only as effective as the level of 
granularity that the client’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) allows. The level of control 
available in DiffServ is achieved through service level agreements that are negotiated 
between the client and the ISP beforehand.  
Given the Navy is its own ISP, there is a level of control not present for most 
Internet consumers, but formalized rules for QoS management must be in place for both 
deployed units and the operating center through which that unit connects to the Internet at 
large. Theses rule sets would need to be coordinated beforehand so that when the time 
comes to implement them they may be done so without error. The Navy currently utilizes 
an adaptation of the DiffServ model to implement QoS management (Automated Digital 
Network System, 2011). 
One approach to QoS management which is very similar to the capabilities of 
ADNS is the work conducted at the University of Florence in Florence, Italy. Ronga et al. 
(2003) have proposed an integrated management QoS management scheme which 
incorporates DiffServ capability coupled with a resource management scheme for 
providing QoS to aggregated end users connecting to the Internet via satellite. Their 
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proposal utilizes three major components: traffic marking—which makes use of the IPv4 
Type of Service (TOS) field to mark traffic, priority management—which incorporates 
random early detection (RED) and First in, First Out (FIFO) policies to meet short term 
QoS requirements, and dynamic resource management—which performs long term 
bandwidth reservation to balance resource allocation (Ronga et al., 2003). ADNS 
incorporates a policy known as weighted random early detection (WRED) in which 
separate traffic classes are given weights based upon their level of importance. This 
weighting provides for a lower probability that a particular traffic type will be dropped 
instead of transmitted, based on the level of information present on the network. ADNS 
behavior will be explored in more depth in Chapter VI. Through experimentation, Ronga 
et al. demonstrated the effectiveness of their approach in providing adequate resource 
allocation for short term traffic bursts while maintaining balanced data throughput across 
the various application types. 
C. DYNAMIC BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION 
The previously described applications work well if the need of the network is 
static; however, the threats posed against Navy units are dynamic and fluid. Leaders must 
often adapt strategies and weapons systems to meet the challenge they are currently 
facing. Given this fact, Navy networks must possess the ability to be changed by the 
operators they are designed to support. Dynamic bandwidth allocation is a process by 
which available network resources, namely bandwidth, are shared fairly among all users 
on that particular network. It takes advantage of the fact that most network traffic is not 
constant and that there is natural variability in the amount of bandwidth required by any 
user at any given time. This network traffic behavior is classified as being “bursty,” 
meaning there are often significant gaps between transmissions by a single application; 
during those gaps, network resources may be given up to other applications requiring 
them. Dynamic bandwidth allocation is implemented through the process of packet-based 
transport. One challenge to this is the dynamic tailoring of QoS management is still in its 
infancy, namely, changes to the client’s desired QoS settings require matching changes 
be implemented on the service provider side, making rapid tailoring of network priorities 
difficult to implement. 
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One area of research that shows potential is being conducted by IEEE members 
Wen-Shyang Hwang and Pei-Chen Tseng. Hwang and Tseng (2005) have proposed the 
development of what they call a QoS-aware Residential Gateway (QRG). While tailored 
for the residential-based network, their QRG approach provides insight into possible 
methods for increased user-friendly network control. QRG works by directed network 
traffic flows to defined classes via the DiffServ model. These classes may be prioritized 
for transmission, thus allowing precedence to be given to high priority traffic. Their 
approach also incorporates classed based queuing (CBQ) to provide for tighter 
management of network resources. They have incorporated an auto-configuration feature 
which allows, via a user friendly interface, the ability to select network settings based on 
either two preset configurations or allowing the user to manually configure the network 
settings, including RSVP and DiffServ settings. Through experimentation, they 
demonstrated significant improvement in data throughput for defined user applications as 
opposed to default network settings without DiffServ controls. Their approach seeks to 
incorporate user network control without negative impact to other users on the same wide 
area network. With further research, it possible that their methodology could be 
employed on a larger scale, thus allowing finer control of network QoS management at 
the unit level. This approach would greatly simplify user interaction with the QoS 
management application allowing greater flexibility and more rapid response to changing 
threat conditions as required for Naval applications. 
Other useful research is being conducted by Stefano Salsano of the University of 
Rome and Luca Veltri of the Italian Research Consortium on Telecommunications. 
Salsano and Veltri (2002) have proposed utilizing and extending the Common Open 
Policy Service (COPS) protocol to transfer information relating to network resource 
allocation between servers and clients. COPS is a subset of the Internet Protocol and 
works as a set of business rules for the implementation of QoS. It serves as a liaison 
between the systems enforcing network policies and those which make decisions 
regarding network policy (Salsano & Veltri, 2002). They suggest its usage in the 
interface between edge nodes and resource allocation nodes to facilitate dynamic QoS 
management in a DiffServ network. This model should allow for provision of network 
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resources to local nodes, ease of local node requests to resource providers and the 
capability to handle specific network requests. These network requests would include 
information about the amount of resources requested, the type of services required, and to 
which queues the resource requests applies. They argue their approach leads to a possible 
method for implementation of dynamic DiffServ QoS as opposed to a static prioritization 
scheme. Application of their research could lead to a more streamlined process by which 
the Navy could implement dynamic QoS management, simplifying the resource 
allocation process and providing greater network control.  
To gain an understanding of how QoS provisions manage network traffic, it is 
important to explain how information routing is conducted in modern network 
infrastructures. There are two approaches for transporting information along a network: 
packet-based transport and time domain multiplexing (TDM). TDM offers the benefit of 
dedicated lines of pathways of communication between end-users facilitated by 
timesharing of network pathways. Packet-based transportation divides data streams into 
manageable data blocks known as “packets,” which are then transported along the 
network via header information contained within each packet. While more conducive to 
QoS management, TDM suffers compared to packet-based transportation methods in 
terms of cost effectiveness. This difference has caused many network services to move 
away from the legacy TDM infrastructure towards packet-based services (Kashihara & 
Tsurusawa, 2010). 
Kashihara and Tsurusawa further indicate that QoS management within a packet-
based IP network is more difficult to implement, requiring a pathway with sufficient, 
guaranteed bandwidth and traffic flows managed to not exceed that bandwidth guarantee. 
Networks which leverage these kind of controls have already been proposed—
incorporating DiffServ traffic engineering (DiffServ-TE) protocols for core routers and 
Call Admission Control (CAC) for edge routing (Kashihara & Tsurusawa, 2010). We 
have previously described the capabilities of the DiffServ model. CAC works by 
monitoring and adjusting IP flow between source and destination clients based on traffic 
demand. Kashihara and Tsurusawa have proposed a technological solution that 
seamlessly integrates the dynamic management of both core and edge bandwidth 
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allocation. Their methodology incorporates regular monitoring of edge router traffic 
flows which aggregate to the total demand on the core router. As traffic requirements 
increase at the edge, the core router looks to expand its available pathway for 
transmission. If these required resources are not available, the edge routers implement 
CAC controls to reject inbound network traffic and reduce the overall demand on the 
network (Kashihara & Tsurusawa, 2010). Through experimentation, they were able to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of their methodology in the estimation of required 
bandwidth by up to 800 flows to within 99.9% accuracy. Their approach provides a more 
accurate prediction of the amount of resources a particular dataflow requires than default 
best-effort processing. Utilizing this predictive approach, it is possible to supply 
applications with only the resources they require and no more. Doing so frees up 
bandwidth to be applied elsewhere and maximizes the network resources at hand. This is 
particularly relevant to the Navy, given that bandwidth at sea comes at a premium. 
Zhao et al. have proposed a methodology which seeks to balance the rate of 
packet loss for different classes of network traffic working within the DiffServ model. 
Traditionally, bandwidth allocation to separate aggregate classes within DiffServ is static. 
This has led to mismatches between assigned bandwidth and network demand, thus 
prompting work in dynamic bandwidth allocation. They indicate that one approach that 
has been developed to dynamically assign bandwidth, namely methods which utilize 
traffic characteristics, i.e., the number of packets in each aggregate class, has fallen short 
in its implementation (Zhao et al., 2012). This flow-number method only incorporates the 
number of packets and not the size of each these packets, possibly leading to increased 
packet loss. They propose a method which incorporates not only the number of packets 
assigned to each aggregate class but also the size of those packets. Through 
experimentation, they were able to demonstrate a marked improvement in the balance of 
packet loss between aggregate classes using their methodology as opposed to traditional 
flow-number approaches. 
The methods and technologies we have presented here are by no means 
comprehensive, but they do provide a fairly wide sampling of potential solutions for the 
implementation of QoS management. In addition, they highlight efforts being conducted 
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within the civilian sector that are applicable to military networks. Having now gained an 
understanding of the state of network QoS technology, it is important to consider how the 
Navy’s net-centric architecture is deployed. 
D. SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE 
Recall the PEO C4I Masterplan’s mandate for service-oriented, open 
architectures. Lund et al. (2007) of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
define Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) in the military context as “a way of making 
military resources available as services so they can be discovered and used by other 
entities that need not be aware of those services in advance.” They have conducted 
extensive research into the applicability of SOA in the implementation of military 
communication networks. They note the benefits of such an approach in providing access 
to military resources across the spectrum of military operations, including coalition and 
unilateral actions. They highlight a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) study 
into network-enabled capabilities (NEC) which was conducted to develop a cooperative 
strategy for development of network enabled systems across coalition networks 
(Bartolomasi et al., 2005). The study emphasizes the need for any such systems to enable 
shared situational awareness and to provide QoS capability. Lund et al. note the issues 
with developing SOA for military use; primarily that SOA was initially developed for use 
in a bandwidth rich environment. They describe this as being equal to military 
applications at the strategic level, but highlight that for SOA to be truly effective it must 
also incorporate units at the tactical level. This requirement is unique in that many units 
operating at this level are extremely limited in their connectivity. Lund et al. call this 
condition “a disadvantaged grid.” They note several approaches for enabling SOA in a 
military environment including general compression of XML and the use of binary XML. 
Through experimentation, they demonstrated the effectiveness of both approaches in 
providing significant reduction in network traffic. They further indicate the importance of 
streamlining the data exchange process. They recommend a hybrid approach in which 
deployed databases are synchronized using a push-based exchange of NATO friendly-
force information (NFFI)-messages. This approach assumes the implementation XML 
compression and binary XML to reduce the data present on the network. They go on to 
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describe methods for implementing communication across the heterogeneous 
infrastructure of which coalition networks are often comprised. Their approach leverages 
the already existing standard for military message handling systems (MMHS) to 
implement store-and-forward processes for data transfer. Finally, they touch on the 
importance of QoS in this SOA environment. They state that even with their approaches 
in place, data requirements may still exceed the resources available. As a result, some 
form of QoS management must be implemented for SOA to be truly effective for military 
use. 
Loyall et al. (2012) have noted some shortfalls of SOA in the provision of QoS. 
They note this gap becomes evident in the lack of its adoption in mission-critical 
distributed, real-time, and embedded (DRE) domains, due to their demanding 
performance requirements. They argue that many of the conventions which make SOA 
desirable, namely flexibility and scalability, also make it less effective for those systems 
requiring greater control and QoS management. They have proposed four separate 
services and mechanisms to implement what they call QoS-Enabled Dissemination 
(QED). Their method incorporates an aggregate QoS management service—which works 
to develop policies for all local QoS management systems and maintain predictable 
network behavior, a QoS policy service—maintaining those policies set by the QoS 
management system, a task management local QoS manager—designed to manage and 
execute central processing unit (CPU) intensive operations for each client, and a 
bandwidth manager—providing bandwidth based on the policies set by the QoS 
management system. Through experimentation, they demonstrated the effectiveness of 
the QED process in improving the effectiveness of existing SOA middleware in 
implementing QoS management in a DRE environment. 
Having gained an understanding of SOA and its context for military applications, 
we next look for a relationship between SOA and the architectural structure we will 
define for the CSG. Doing so allows us to truly prioritize those systems which are the 
most important relevant to a given mission. Using the technologies we have previously 
described, it is then possible to deploy a network prioritization scheme which emphasizes 
the user’s needs. 
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E. CAPABILITY-BASED COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT  
Recent efforts by the Naval War College have developed a high level architecture 
for maritime operations based on a concept of globally linked Maritime Operations 
Centers. Through the process of Capability-Based Competency Assessment (CBCA), 
mission essential tasks have been identified and translated into a set of competencies 
which incorporate operations, personnel, and system requirements. These competencies 
act as operational nodes on which the high level architecture is developed. We can 
leverage their methodology, which seeks to map task to operator, and operator to system, 
to develop our architectural framework for true war-fighting optimization. Defining such 
architecture is a crucial first step in understanding the impact of SOA and capturing the 
benefits of its deployment. The end goal of this high level architecture is to improve 
command and control and aid the decision maker at the enterprise level. Operating at this 
level of abstraction, it is imperative that the architecture capture not only the people or 
processes to be implemented, but also the links between the processes as well as the 
information required and the methods for completing those processes. By identifying 
these operational nodes and linking them to the network services required for completing 
their assigned tasks, a service-oriented architectural description for Navy battle groups 
underway may be developed.  
Such an approach departs from the traditional, billet-based, allocation of 
personnel and seeks to define “roles” which act as critical nodes that correspond to a 
DoDAF Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2) of the overall operational 
architecture. These roles would act independently of the personnel assigned to complete 
them; however, training pipelines would ideally be tailored to fill those roles. Through 
the process of CBCA, these roles, and their associated subtasks—i.e., processes—may be 
identified and the duration and prioritization of each of those subtasks determined. By 
linking the operational nodes which are passing information to the corresponding data 
relationships captured by an Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability 




services are better aligned within the overall system architecture and commanders are 
able to more effectively use existing network resources to accomplish required tasks 
within a compressed time frame. 
By using the relationships identified in our SV-5a viewpoint, we can recognize 
those systems which are most relevant to the threat at hand and give them precedence 
over other networked systems operating on the network. These relationships are mission-
oriented and provide the justification necessary for preferring one network application 
over another. This preference is done by separately classifying those relevant systems and 
assigning sufficient bandwidth to them in order to achieve a desired outcome—i.e., 
ensuring latency and throughput are within an acceptable level. Once we have developed 
our proposed prioritization scheme, it will be tested and compared to the existing ADNS 
prioritization scheme in a scenario designed to stress the networks of both the aircraft 
carrier and its escort vessels. We will use the results for comparison and analysis and 
draw conclusions from the information we gather. 
The end goal of this approach is to provide a clear process for the prioritization of 
network traffic which can be manipulated and expressed by both the tactician and the 
technician. Rather than expressly dictating the actual networked systems which should 
take priority over others, we have sought to develop a methodology by which the 
commander, who may not be well versed in computer science, can sit down with those 
operating his networks and develop a prioritization scheme that optimizes his computer 
networks as a weapon. Too often, Navy shipboard networks are seen simply as 
administrative systems and that become a burden when they do not operate properly. As 
the Navy transitions to a truly networked architecture, so too must our commanders 
evolve to capture the benefits that such a networked approach brings. Ideally the process 
we outline here would be used in conjunction with the Operational Tasking (OPTASK) 
orders that are already defined for a strike group prior to sail and the centralized planning 
process that occurs during the warfare commander’s conference. As the level of threat to 
his ships increases, the network may be shifted to provide optimum capability against the 
threat-at-hand. The strike group commander would define those systems which are most 
relevant to the particular mission at hand and would prepare a set of pre-planned 
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responses (PPRs) for the operation of the networks, just as he would for any other 
weapon system at his disposal. Only when we begin to think of our computer systems as 
weapons of war may we truly optimize them for that purpose.  
In this paper, we will look at two research questions:  
1) What is the feasibility of developing a bandwidth utilization priority scheme 
based upon identified tasks and information required by warfighters to conduct 
military operations within a hostile environment? 
2) How will this systematic allocation process, based upon warfighter information 
needs and dynamically tailored for various threats, affect data latency and 
information throughput? 
To answer the first question we will propose a methodology which seeks to 
prioritize network applications based upon their relevance to the warfighter. We will 
outline a process—which links task to operator and operator to system—for developing 
such a prioritization scheme and demonstrate its effectiveness in limiting relevant data 
latency and increasing relevant data throughput. In so doing, we will seek to get the most 
pertinent information to decision makers faster, thereby yielding superior tactical network 
usage.  
To answer the second question we will develop a realistic, wartime scenario in 
which to vet the effectiveness of our prioritization scheme and compare its results with 
that of existing Navy network prioritization schemes. Finally, using the results from our 
scenario, we will draw conclusions regarding our methodology’s effectiveness and make 
recommendations for future research and implementation. 
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II. STRIKE GROUP FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
DESCRIPTION 
A. CURRENT SURFACE WARFARE DOCTRINE 
Our prioritization scheme is designed to optimize warfighter abilities by matching 
network system priorities to the prioritization of the tasks required to accomplish the 
overarching warfare capability. In order to develop our prioritization methodology, we 
must gain an understanding of the functional architecture for which the network in 
question is designed to support. Doing so allows us to capture the relationships between 
the warfighters operating in this system-of-systems and will ultimately provide the 
justification for our prioritization scheme. The first step in this process is to define the 
scope of the system-of-systems we will be examining. For the purpose of our study, we 
will be examining the impact of our prioritization scheme on the Carrier Strike Group. 
The following section explains the prominence the aircraft carrier holds in American 
foreign policy and why we choose it to vet our methodology. 
1. The Importance of the Carrier Strike Group 
The President’s strategic guidance details America’s ability as the sole nation 
capable of military power projection and sustained military operations. As a country, we 
retain the right to use force when necessary and extend our control when all other means 
of coercion have been exhausted. Included in this sphere of control is the ability to ensure 
the constant flow of commerce by keeping the sea lanes open for safe transit (Office of 
the President of the United States, 2010). 
Prerequisite to exercising this control is a strong naval force that acts as the arm 
of its home nation. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) argued that the very existence of the 
Navy is due to the need to protect the commercial interests of its country. Because of the 
global nature of American interests, it follows that the United States must be able to 
employ power on the sea. 
Dr. Daniel Goure of the Lexington Institute indicates that the Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG) is the essence of this naval power for the United States. He states that the CSG is 
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“able to exert influence and control over an enormous volume of sea and air space, 
ensuring the free flow of goods and people across the global commons.”  Additionally, he 
argues that the destructive power a CSG can levy against hostile forces is unparalleled in 
conventional warfare (Goure, 2011). Given the unmatched benefits, the CSG will 
continue to serve as the primary instrument of U.S. force projection well into the 21st 
century (PEO C4I, 2010). For this reason, the CSG will serve as the principle subject of 
this thesis. 
2. Composition of the Carrier Strike Group 
There is no formal definition of a CSG (United States Navy, 2012). The formation 
and composition of a CSG are variable depending on the circumstances of its use; 
however according to the U.S. Navy’s website, a CSG is typically comprised of the 
following: 
 An aircraft carrier—an aircraft carrier is a large deck ship, over 1,000 feet in 
length, and equipped with 60+ aircraft capable of extended on-station time 
and a wide variety of missions. Nuclear powered, the aircraft carrier is capable 
of extended operations at high speed and is an integral part of U.S. strategy 
abroad. The aircraft carrier serves many roles for the United States. These 
include U.S. power projection and humanitarian aid. In this capacity, the 
carrier serves as the high value unit (HVU) around which the other units 
within the strike group are centered. In addition, the carrier also houses the 
strike group commander and the majority of his staff. As such, the carrier is 
the central hub around which the strike group is built. 
 A guided missile cruiser—the Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser is a 
gas turbine warship with a crew of over 350 personnel. Equipped with the 
AEGIS combat suite and a wide variety of missile and gun systems, the 
guided missile cruiser is well equipped in its primary role of air defense. The 
AEGIS combat suite is an integrated sensor and weapons systems using the 
SPY-1 phased array radar, weapons control computers, and the vertical launch 
system for anti-air missile deployment. The guided missile cruiser typically 
serves as the air defense commander (ADC) and is responsible for the 
coordination of area air defense around the strike group. 
 Two guided missile destroyers—the Arleigh Burke class guided missile 
destroyer is an AEGIS, gas turbine warship armed with air, surface and 
subsurface weaponry. The guided missile destroyer is capable of a wide 
variety of missions and is considered one of the most powerful warships ever 
fielded. In the CSG, the guided missile destroyers serve in a primarily air 
defense role. 
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 An attack submarine—the Los Angeles class attack submarine serves as the 
backbone of the U.S. submarine force. While many are capable of launching 
the Tomahawk cruise missile, the Los Angeles class is primarily employed to 
seek out and destroy enemy submarines and surface combatants. As such, the 
attack submarine serves to defeat surface and sub-surface threats to the CSG. 
 A logistic support ship—the Supply class is a high speed vessel capable of 
extended operations alongside the CSG. Operating under the Military Sealift 
Command, the logistic support ship provides support to the other ships within 
the strike group and is capable of carrying more than 170,000 barrels of oil 
and a wide variety of provisions and ammunition. 
Each ship type plays a vital role in the operation of the CSG, and although there is 
no standardized CSG format, this grouping is typical and will be considered the 
composition for analysis. In an air defense scenario, the purpose of the ships other than 
the carrier in the strike group is to offer defensive support for and enable the HVU. 
Milan Vego (2007) of the Naval War College classifies this defensive support as 
operational protection, the goal of which is “to protect the physical capabilities and 
moral strength of one’s combat forces.” While this operational protection encompasses 
all warfare areas, there are few operations that pose the unique challenges of sea-based 
air defense—perhaps chief among them being the need for rapid response. Given the 
speed at which air defense operations take place, this arena potentially has more to 
benefit from dynamic bandwidth allocation than most. For this reason, an air detect-to-
engage (DTE) scenario was chosen to demonstrate the effectiveness of Capabilities-based 
prioritization. 
An air DTE scenario is the summation of air defense operations. It is divided into 
separate phases as the air defense team works to detect potential threats, classify them as 
such, identify the type of threat, and ultimately—if needed—engage those threats. While 
every DTE sequence may not culminate in an engagement, carrying the scenario through 
to its logical conclusion allows for observation of the full array of strike group operations 
in an air threat environment. As a result, the submarine and logistic support ships, which 
are usually part of a CSG composition, were set aside when developing the initial 
architecture description, as they do not provide any air defense capability. 
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Having established the scope of our research, we must now seek to understand the 
relationships between those operating within the CSG to conduct air defense. The 
following section seeks to capture those operational relationships and define the strike 
group architecture. 
B. COMPOSITE WARFARE CONCEPT 
1. Description of the Composite Warfare Concept 
Generally, a command organization should be adaptive, yet straightforward in its 
execution (Vego, 2007). In order to be effective, information needs to be moved quickly 
from the gathering source to those who require it within the command organization. 
According to Vego, the fundamental prerequisites to a successful command and control 
(C2) architecture are: centralized direction and decentralized execution. These principles 
serve to reinforce the adaptive nature of the command organization while increasing the 
speed at which information can flow within its construct. 
Vego states that the centralized direction principle establishes unity of command. 
While this somewhat inhibits lower level decision-making, this ideally supports the 
overall ability of the command organization to perform. Additionally, this principle 
provides the direction needed for the centralization of information-gathering and 
decision-making, thereby increasing the tempo of information movement (Vego, 2007). 
The decentralized execution principle helps to counterbalance the limits placed on 
lower level commanders inherent to centralized direction. Ideally, the high level 
commanders specify only the objectives that need be accomplished (Vego, 2007). 
Authority is then delegated to the appropriate level to accomplish the objective, given 
that the objective is met following the established directives of the overall commander in 
charge. This concept allows for the maximum amount of flexibility within a command 
organization while not countermanding the principle of centralized direction. 
Combined together, the concepts of centralized direction and decentralized 
execution form the backbone of the Composite Warfare Concept (CWC) (Morua, 2000). 
This concept of operation places the overall Carrier Strike Group Commander at the 
center of the information gathering hub. The Carrier Strike Group Commander is usually 
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designated with the call sign BB (Bravo Bravo). His authority is then delegated to his 
subordinate commanders who exercise control over the warfare areas which they have 
been assigned (Morua, 2000). This organizational construct allows for the application of 
the two previously described fundamental principles: centralized direction and 
decentralized execution. 
2. Application to the Carrier Strike Group 
Under the CWC, BB assigns duties to each of his subordinate commanders 
(Morua, 2000). In terms of air defense, the relevant individual is the Air Warfare 
Commander—typically the commanding officer of the cruiser, designated BW (Bravo 
Whiskey). As such, he is responsible for the defense of the air space around the CSG. 
Working with BW are the individual air defense units (ADUs), including the 
destroyers and the cruiser itself, acting as an entity separate from BW. Each of these air 
defense units contains an air defense team comprised of the following individuals: 
 Commanding Officer (CO)—the CO has overall command of the individual 
ADU and is the only individual who may authorize release of offensive 
weapons. In this capacity, he represents the ship itself within the overarching 
air defense framework. He, meaning his ship, may be assigned tasking by BB 
in order to assist in the protection of the CSG but for the most part, operations 
are conducted according to a set of preplanned responses subject to negation 
by BB. 
 Tactical Action Officer (TAO)—the TAO acts as the CO’s representative in 
his absence and is delegated weapons’ release authority for defensive 
purposes only. Though his responsibility extends to all warfare areas, the 
TAO is an integral member of the air defense team and all other air defense 
team members on his platform are subordinate to his direction. 
Communications to BB are typically conducted by the TAO for the CO, but 
operational control still flows through the CO. 
 Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC)—the CSC is responsible for the 
coordination and management of all combat systems onboard. His position is 
unique in that he must be able to marry the concerns of both the tactician and 
the technician. Balance must be struck between mission priority and necessary 
repair. He is not a direct member of the air defense team, but his role as chief 
technician prevents his exclusion from this list. Additionally he is capable, at 
the CO or TAO’s direction, of releasing the ship’s weapons against a target. 
He is subordinate to the TAO. 
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 Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC)—the AAWC is responsible for the 
coordination and de-confliction of the air space in and around the individual 
air defense unit. He works in conjunction with other AAWCs onboard the 
other air defense units and BW in order to identify and prioritize threats to the 
CSG. Additionally, he may receive tasking and direction by BB, via BW, for 
assets being controlled by his air defense unit or his unit itself. Most other 
members of the air defense team are subordinate to his direction, but he 
remains subordinate to the TAO. Like the CSC, the AAWC is capable, at the 
CO or TAO’s direction, of releasing the ship’s weapons against a target. 
 Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC)—the TIC is responsible for 
maintaining the various Tactical Data Links (TADL) on which the ship is 
communicating. These links work to pass known track information from ship 
to ship, whether or not that ship actually holds that track with its own sensors. 
Working in conjunction with the TICs from the other air defense units and the 
strike group’s Force Over the Horizon Track Coordinator (FOTC), the TIC 
de-conflicts link tracks and pushes identifications made by the air defense unit 
to the other ships in the strike group. He is subordinate to the AAWC. 
 Missile System Supervisor (MSS)—the MSS is responsible for coordinating 
and relaying the status of the air defense unit’s missile systems to the rest of 
the air defense team. Additionally, he must electronically release missiles 
being fired from his ship. He is primarily subordinate to the CSC for technical 
matters but coordinates with the AAWC and is subject to his direction. 
 Radar System Coordinator (RSC)—the RSC acts in a similar fashion to the 
MSS, in that he is responsible for coordinating and relaying the status of the 
air defense unit’s radar systems to the rest of the air defense team. 
Additionally, he is able to view raw radar data and can provide clarification 
for any ambiguous tracks the ship’s radar holds. He is primarily subordinate to 
the CSC for technical matters but coordinates with the AAWC and is subject 
to his direction. 
 Air Intercept Controller (AIC)—the AIC is responsible for coordinating and 
relaying the status of and direction to any tactical airborne fixed wing aircraft 
under the air defense unit’s control. These aircraft are known as Defensive 
Counter Air (DCA) and may be used to identify potential hostile targets, 
escort targets of interest through the CSG’s airspace, or actively engage 
hostile targets. While normally part of a carrier air wing, DCA become an 
extension of the ship controlling them while operating. The AIC is 
subordinate to the AAWC. 
 Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC)—the EWC relays electronic sensor 
information from the ship’s sensors and intelligence information from off ship 
sources. Working in conjunction with the strike group’s Command & Control 
Warfare (C2W) Commander (BQ), the EW works to provide electronic 
warfare capability and intelligence information. He is subordinate to the 
AAWC. 
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Each of these individuals serves as an operational node within the architectural 
description of a carrier strike group. Their relationships may be captured through 
standard Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF) products and the 
structure of the strike group’s architecture may begin to take shape. 
3. Architectural Description 
Based on the identified operational nodes, the roles, and their relationships to one 
another, an architectural description may be developed. The DoD guidance on 
Architectural Framework Version 1.5, volume I, identifies several important uses of 
architectures. One of these is for the description of mission areas. The use of an 
architectural description allows for the management of capabilities and the development 
of the enterprise architecture necessary to support that mission area. As such, DoDAF 
Version 1.5 may be used to capture the relationships between the operational nodes and 
guide the description of the mission area.  
An Organizational Relationships Chart (OV-4) is useful for the clarification of the 
roles and responsibilities of each operational node (Figure 1). This diagram captures the 
overall command structure of the CSG and provides a simplified picture of the 
relationships between each operational node (DoD, 2007). 
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Figure 1.   Strike Group OV-4, Organizational Relationships Chart 
Given the defined parameters, an Operational Node Connectivity (OV-2) diagram 
can be developed to capture the structure of the strike group (Figure 2). According to the 
DoD guidance on Architectural Framework, this diagram serves to show the operational 
nodes and the communication needs between them. The communication (or need) lines 
show the flow of information between the operational activities. Each operational node 
has associated tasks which, when completed, aggregate to complete the overarching task 




Figure 2.   Air Defense OV-2, Operational Node Connectivity Diagram 
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 Figure 2 illustrates the relationships between a single ADU and the off-ship 
warfare commanders and coordinators. The relationships pictured are duplicated for each 
ADU operating in the CSG. Coordination by the individual units independent of the 
Strike Group commander is rare and there is no command and control (C2) independent 
of the chain of command. 
 Using this architectural description, the systems required by each of the 
operational nodes to complete their assigned tasks can then be linked to the overall 
architecture description. This allows for the identification of those systems which are 
relevant to the overarching task of the air DTE and those which are not. In so doing, we 
can identify a prioritization scheme for information requiring transmission based on that 
information’s relevance to the mission at hand. Our recommendation for the development 
of this process scheme will be presented in Chapter IV, but first we must understand the 
driving force behind this networked concept. The next section seeks to define the reason 
for this networked system approach and why such a prioritization scheme is necessary. 
C. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
The Office of Force Transformation uses the term Network-Centric Warfare 
(NCW) to define the military operations and organizational structures that are emerging 
as forces become more networked together. This represents a paradigm shift from the 
idea of platform-centric operations to the encompassing of the “network” as a whole. 
Traditionally, platform-centric operations treated individual units as self-contained 
operators within their environment. In a network-centric environment, each platform 
comes equipped with services that can be “networked” together to achieve mission 
success. Is this context, network means not only the systems involved but also the 
operators behind those systems (Office of Force Transformation, 2005). As such, it is 
important to incorporate this understanding of the military organizational structure of the 
CSG as a network of systems and people into the way in which the organization 
operates—namely the Composite Warfare Concept (CWC), described in Section B of this 
chapter. 
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The PEO C4I Masterplan states that the purpose of NCW is to “increase combat 
effectiveness” through “information sharing” and providing “combined situational 
awareness” that acts to “accelerate C2 through synchronizing battle space efforts.” In 
order to combat the “fog of war,” battlefield commanders must be provided information 
that is time critical, accurate, and sufficient to increase situational awareness (SA). In this 
way, NCW serves to enable the CWC and increase the speed of command—getting 
sufficient, quality information to the decision maker as rapidly as possible and 
disseminating command decisions just as quickly (PEO C4I, 2010). 
The Navy continues to take strides toward NCW, seeking to increase the 
robustness of information passed along the network and decrease the time for this 
information to get through. This movement toward NCW, epitomized by the Global 
Information Grid (GIG) concept, is curtailed by one thing—limited bandwidth (PEO C4I, 
2010). As the volume of information demanded by end users increases, the constraints of 
the limited pipeline to push that information through become more evident. Bandwidth at 
sea is further limited by satellite availability and time sharing constraints, making for an 
even more challenging environment.  
These challenges become clearer when applied to a tactical situation. Current 
surface warfare doctrine divides surface combat into three separate domains: air and 
missile defense, undersea warfare, and anti-surface warfare (Naval Transformation 
Roadmap, 2003). Each domain dictates its own requirements in terms of tactics and 
priorities. Often, surface combatants are faced with multiple, simultaneous threats 
operating within separate domains. As a result, non-collaborating shipboard systems may 
compete for limited bandwidth in order to push information to separate off-ship decision 
makers. This competition becomes even more intense as the threat level increases and the 
environment becomes more saturated with enemy combatants. 
A distinction should be drawn between the idea of increasing the information flow 
to the decision maker and the idea of autonomy by lower-level decision makers. While 
bandwidth optimization can significantly increase the amount of information sent to the 
decision maker, it does nothing to affect the C2 organization in which it is being used. 
The DoD Office of Force Transformation identifies nine governing principles of NCW, 
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among which is the idea of force Self-Synchronization. Self-Synchronization seeks to 
optimize the autonomy of subordinate forces to the point of self-re-tasking. This is 
accomplished through increased information dissemination and shared battle space 
awareness coupled with an understanding of “commander’s intent” (Office of Force 
Transformation, 2005). Methodologies that increase the information flow rate but do not 
address the latency inherent to the traditional C2 organization—that is to say the speed of 
the networked response—are ultimately limited by the speed of command decision. This 
can be thought of as Industrial Age thinking that is being enabled by Information Age 
doctrine. As technology increases and NCW becomes the norm, it may be necessary to 
adjust the traditional command structure to fully capture the capabilities of the networked 
force. 
 The following chapter will define the Capabilities-based Competency Assessment 
approach we used to develop our proposed prioritization scheme. It will encompass the 
architectural descriptions we have defined here to establish justification for giving 
priority for one networked application over another. Next, a CSG operating environment 
and air DTE scenario will be developed which will stress current network capabilities. 
Using the developed scenario, we will evaluate both the current and our method for 
prioritizing bandwidth and the results of each will be compared and analyzed.    
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III. CAPABILITIES-BASED COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT 
A. THE NEED FOR DYNAMIC BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION 
While the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) serves a primarily national defense role, its 
use as a tool for U.S. foreign policy is both varied and vast. The President’s 2010 
National Security Strategy addresses the need for the U.S. to remain the world leader in 
responding to natural disasters. Natural disasters continue to pose a serious risk to 
civilians worldwide. Given the large amount of resources at its disposal, the ability to 
reach distant locations in a timely manner, and its inherent flexibility, the CSG often acts 
as the first American response to natural disasters both in the U.S. and abroad. Recent 
examples include the USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70) response to the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti, the USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76) 2011 response to the earthquake and 
subsequent tsunami in Japan, and the 2004 USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) 
response to the tsunami in the Indian Ocean.  
System priorities and demands vary greatly from traditional CSG roles to that of 
disaster relief. While air defense operations are imperative to the defense of the carrier, 
they do little to assist in a disaster relief scenario. Air operations move from providing 
defense capability to enabling the movement of supplies and evacuation of the wounded. 
Strike groups’ command and control architecture must be able to encompass not only 
U.S. military agencies but also international military and non-government organizations 
as well, moving from the classified to the almost entirely unclassified domain. Given the 
inherent flexibility of the CSG, it provides a common sense response to international 
tragedy; but in order to fully maximize the capabilities of the CSG, network priorities 
must be able to shift. While it is important that the defensive capabilities of the CSG 
remain in place, they may find themselves in a reduced role during times of disaster 
relief. 
This idea extends logically to varying tactical missions as well. The priorities 
during air defense operations are not necessarily the same as those during an anti-
submarine scenario or even normal underway steaming. The heavy intelligence gathering 
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requirements of a strike or air defense mission do not reflect the intensive processing 
inherent to defeating an enemy submarine. Likewise, the administrative burden of normal 
underway steaming can take priority during times of peace but should fall by the wayside 
in a wartime environment—given such a burden would detract from the mission of 
defending the ship. If priority is not given to mission critical applications as they relate to 
the mission at hand, network capability is not optimized and as a result, the overall 
effectiveness of the CSG is diminished. 
The idea of mission-based network prioritization has not been lost on the fleet at 
large. There is an increased demand for the ability to modify Quality of Service (QoS) 
priorities, based on mission specific tasking (Rambo, 2011). The benefit of this approach 
is that it can reduce network response times and increase network throughput according 
to what the mission commander needs. When information gets to the decision maker 
faster, there is more time to develop the “right” decision. By developing the ability to 
provide dynamic bandwidth allocation at the application level, shipboard services may be 
prioritized correctly and more quickly based on the mission priorities—thus leading to 
increased mission effectiveness and less wasted network resources. 
B. CURRENT BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION SCHEME 
The Navy’s system for the allocation of bandwidth at sea is the Automated Digital 
Network System (ADNS). Initially fielded in the late 1990s, ADNS works by routing 
data that is outbound from the ship through the various Radio Frequency (RF) paths 
available for its transmission (Rambo, 2011). One of the important capabilities of ADNS 
is the delivery of basic Quality of Service (QoS) capability. QoS enables the network to 
make “smart” decisions when available network resources are overtaxed by the amount 
of information they are being required to route (Rambo, 2011). Without QoS, all 
shipboard network traffic would compete for the same RF pipeline and there is no ability 
to prioritize information. 
Subsequent variants of ADNS have allowed for improved bandwidth management 
and enhanced QoS administration; however, there is still room to improve the QoS 
capability. The current ADNS variant, Increment Three (ADNS INC III), enables QoS 
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through static application prioritization. ADNS works to mark data packets generated by 
these applications and then transmits them through a “packetshaper” which assigns a 
priority to the traffic being transmitted. These packets are then sorted into bins according 
to their assigned prioritization and transmitted accordingly. This prioritization scheme is 
set by the Naval Cyber Forces (NCF) command and can only be modified through an 
extended process and is not subject to change by ship’s force (Rambo, 2011).  
Shipboard networks are divided into Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized 
Information (TS/SCI), Secret, Unclassified, and a separate Coalition classification 
enclaves. There is an additional enclave dedicated to network overhead and encryption. 
Data packets generated by shipboard applications are marked using the Type of Service 
IPv4 header at a packet shaper operating with each classification enclave and routed to 
various network queues based on this marking operating within ADNS (Automated 
Digital Network System, 2011). Each queue is guaranteed a minimum amount of 
bandwidth allocated to it. Once these data packets have been routed to their appropriate 
queues, transmission is dictated by either First In First Out (FIFO)—i.e., the first data 
packet to arrive is the first to leave—or by Cisco Weighted Random Early Detection 
(WRED). WRED works by having the network router (ADNS is this case) randomly drop 
IP packets being sent by applications. This dropping of packets causes the application 
transmitting those packets to assume network congestion and slow down the rate of 
transmission. The packets are dropped based on a given probability schedule. 
Applications given a higher priority are assigned a lower probability of drop and thus, a 
higher throughput. This weighting is done via a formal submission process and the 
application priority is validated by Naval Cyber Forces (Rambo, 2011). Additionally, if 
applications are not utilizing the minimum bandwidth allowance, that bandwidth is 
shared with other applications.  
Given the changing priorities of separate mission areas, it is imperative that 
shipboard personnel be able to assign prioritizations dynamically to shipboard network 
services. This need continues to grow as the Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and 
Enterprise Services (CANES) system is fielded.  
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Per SPAWAR’s CANES website, CANES will serve to consolidate and replace 
five existing legacy networks afloat. These systems include Integrated Shipboard 
Network System (ISNS), Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Networks, and 
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System Maritime (CENTRIXS-
M). Through the utilization of the Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) concept, CANES 
will eliminate redundant legacy hardware and replace them with a single, consolidated 
system. According to the CNO’s CANES Initial Implementation and Action Message, 
DTG 071927Z DEC 09, all shipboard systems that will be fielded after the 
implementation of CANES must be compatible with the new common network hardware. 
This single, common computing environment provides the necessary framework to 
implement Quality of Service (QoS) at this level of granularity. Since all applications will 
be housed on a single network, control will encompass every possible system regardless 
of mission. 
C. THE CAPABILITIES-BASED COMPETENCY APPROACH 
Recent efforts by the Naval War College have developed an approach to 
manpower analysis known as Capabilities-based Competency Assessment (CBCA). 
CBCA differs from traditional manpower analysis in that it seeks to identify functional 
roles working within a team construct versus looking at billets and shipboard occupations 
(Suttie & Potter, 2008). These functional roles are linked to identified “subtasks” which 
aggregate to complete mission level tasking. The major distinction of CBCA is the focus 
on capability versus a set of competencies (Suttie & Potter, 2008). Suttie and Potter 
provide the example of a plumber. CBCA is not concerned with making a better plumber 
by understanding what he does; instead CBCA seeks to understand the role of the 
plumber in the upkeep of a home. It is not important for the homeowner to understand 
how the plumber fixes his sink, only his relationship to the plumber and the capability 
that he provides. Once the capability inherent to the role is understood, its relationship to 
other roles working in the total system can be comprehended. 
The end goal of CBCA is to solve the disparity between the needs of the 
Operational Commander to complete mission specific tasking and the legacy manpower 
and system requirements which are inherent to the more traditional manpower 
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approaches. This is accomplished by linking mission essential task lists (METLs) to the 
personnel and systems required to complete them. Such an approach departs from the 
traditional, billet-based, allocation of personnel and seeks to define “roles” which act as 
critical nodes that correspond to a Department of Defense Architectural Framework 
(DoDAF) Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2) (Suttie R. D., 2011) of the 
overall operational architecture. These roles would act independently of the personnel 
assigned to complete them; however, training pipelines would ideally be tailored to fill 
those roles. 
This study applies the process of Capability-Based Competency Assessment 
(CBCA) to identify METLs which can then be used to identify a set of competencies 
which incorporate operations, personnel, and system requirements inherent to air defense 
operations as suggested by Suttie & Potter (2008). These competencies act as operational 
nodes on which the high level architecture is developed. Defining such an architecture is 
a crucial first step in understanding the impact of Service-Oriented Architecture and 
capturing the benefits of its deployment. The end goal of this high level architecture is to 
improve command and control and aid the decision maker at the enterprise level. 
Operating at this level of abstraction, it is imperative that the architecture capture not 
only the people or processes to be implemented, but also the links between the processes 
and the methods for completing those processes. 
The Service-Oriented Architecture framework is formed by assigning METLs to 
the operational nodes responsible for their execution and which are completing activities 
which aggregate to complete an overarching high-level activity. These relationships are 
captured by an Operational Activity Model Description (OV-5). This model may be 
completed in conjunction with a Systems Functionality Description (SV-4), which not 
only captures the decomposition of the top-level activity, but also identifies the systems 
used to enable functionality. Finally, the relationships between the operators, their 
responsible actions, and the systems used to complete those actions are captured via an 
Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5a). By doing so, the 
relationships between the operational nodes and the systems that each node uses to 
accomplish those tasks are identified. 
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This approach ensures that the operational nodes and services are aligned within 
the overall system architecture and commanders are able to more effectively leverage 
existing network resources to accomplish required tasks within a compressed time frame 
based on identified mission priorities. These products are used to understand the 
relationships between operator and machine and allow the warfare commander to assign 
the correct prioritization to the systems at his disposal. Once form has been matched to 
function, it is possible to understand which nodes and, as a result, which systems are 
needed to complete an aggregate task. This process provides justification and realization 
of the most beneficial arrangement for network prioritization. By assigning the highest 
level of prioritization to those network applications needed to accomplish mission 
appropriate tasking, a strike group’s network resources are used to their fullest capability. 
The performance of all other systems which are not crucial to the completion of the 
assigned tasking should be sacrificed in order to benefit those that are imperative. 
D. DEFINING THE OPERATIONAL NODES 
Before system prioritization can take place, it is essential to identify the users that 
will operate those systems. For the purpose of our study, these users have already been 
identified. The operational nodes from the Operational Node Connectivity (OV-2) 
diagram defined in Chapter II will be used for our CBCA analysis. The second step is to 
identify the tasks associated with each user for the purpose of completing air defense 
operations. These tasks too have already been identified and analyzed. They are listed 
within the Navy’s Universal Naval Task List discussed in the next paragraph. 
The Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) serves as a repository for tasks that can be 
completed by Naval forces. Defined as the what, not necessarily the how, of Naval 
warfare, the UNTL is used by commanders to determine what can be done by the Naval 
elements under their command. Mission essential task lists (METLs) are derived from 
this list and are used to support a commander’s assigned mission. They serve as a 
command’s list of tasks that are considered essential for mission accomplishment (Chief 
of Naval Operations, Commandant, United States Marine Corp, Commandant, United 
States Coast Guard, 2007). For example, if a commander wanted the ships under his 
command to move, he would consult the Navy Tactical Tasks (NTA) 1.1 Move Naval 
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Tactical Forces. Under this task are the subtasks associated with ship movement. The 
subtasks that the commander deems to be important would be identified and the units 
under his command must prepare to be able to meet those tasks as defined in the 
documentation associated with them. 
By parsing this list of mission capabilities and identifying those relevant mission 
tasks, it becomes possible to prioritize tasks based on their relevance to the mission at 
hand. The next logical step is to assign the information systems required to accomplish 
those tasks the same level of priority to develop the final scheme for appropriate 
bandwidth allocation. 
E. SUBTASKS REQUIRED FOR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS 
We can now examine the UNTL. The UNTL is subdivided into separate task 
levels for each level of warfare. The prefix for tactical level tasks is TA, thus Naval tasks 
at the tactical level are known as Navy Tactical Tasks (NTA). An examination of the 
UNTL reveals which NTA’s are relevant to air defense is provided in Table 1. By using 
the descriptions provided in the UNTL for each NTA, it is possible to compile a succinct 






















NTA 2.1 Plan and Direct Intelligence Operations 
 NTA 2.2 Perform Collection Operations and Management 
NTA 2.2.1 Collect Target Information 
NTA 2.2.3 Perform Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
NTA 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Information and Intelligence 
NTA 2.4 Conduct Analysis and Produce Intelligence 
NTA 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence 


















NTA 3.1 Process Targets 
NTA 3.1.5 Conduct Tactical Combat Assessment 
NTA 3.2 Attack Targets 
NTA 3.2.5 Conduct Electronic Attack 
NTA 3.2.7 Intercept, Engage, and Neutralize Enemy Aircraft and Missile Targets 




























NTA 5.1 Acquire, Process, Communicate Information, and Maintain Status 
NTA 5.2 Analyze and Assess Situation 
NTA 5.4 Direct, Lead, and Coordinate Forces 
NTA 5.5 Conduct Information Warfare (IW) 

















NTA 6.1 Enhance Survivability 
 NTA 6.1.1 Protect Against Combat Area Hazards 
NTA 
6.1.1.3 
Positively Identify Friendly Forces 
NTA 6.5 Perform Consequence Management 
NTA 6.5.2 Coordinate Damage Control Operations 
Table 1.   Air Defense NTAs (After Universal Naval Task List, by Chief of Naval 
Operations, Commandant, United States Marine Corp, Commandant, 
United States Coast Guard, 2007, Washington, DC: Chief of Naval 
Operations; Commandant of the Marine Corps; and Headquarters United 
States Coast Guard).  
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The DoD guidance on Architectural Framework Version 1.5, volume II, defines 
an OV-5, Operational Activity Model, as describing the operations conducted to 
complete a mission. It provides the flow between operational activities and when used 
with an OV-2, Operational Node Connectivity Diagram, it serves to identify the 
operational nodes responsible for those activities.  
An OV-5 (Figure 3) is constructed by taking each of the NTA’s identified as 
relevant to air defense operations as presented in Table 1, establishing a hierarchy of 
those tasks, and mapping each NTA to the operational node responsible for its 
completion. This description may later be used to assist in mapping the systems used by 













 Several of the mid-level functions appear to be decomposed by only one sub-
function. For example, NTA 3.1 Process Targets is decomposed only by NTA 3.1.5 
Conduct Tactical Combat Assessment. This is due to the arrangement of the UNTL. NTA 
3.1 is actually decomposed by several sub NTAs, but not all of them are applicable to air 
defense. In order to simplify the diagram, only those sub-functions which were relevant 
to air defense operations were recorded in Figure 4. 
 Having identified the operational activities involved in the process of conducting 
air defense and linking the each of these activities to the operational node responsible for 
their completion, the next step in our process to tie in the systems that each of those 
operational nodes require to complete their assigned tasking. Linking this form to 
function will provide the justification for our prioritization scheme. The next section is 
dedicated to identifying those systems and mapping their relationship to each other.   
F. IDENTIFYING REQUIRED SYSTEMS FOR AIR DEFENSE 
OPERATIONS 
The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) 
Masterplan serves to summarize the major attributes of DoN network-centric systems. 
The Masterplan categorizes ships types at different levels. Aircraft carriers are identified 
as Force Level Ships, Cruisers and Destroyers Group Level. It provides C4I system 
baselines for each of these ship types as projected through FY12. These baseline 
descriptions may be used to determine those systems which communicate via ADNS and 
could therefore, benefit from network prioritization. By using the system descriptions 
presented in the C4I Masterplan, a list was developed of those systems required to 
conduct air defense operations (Table 2).  
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1) Direction finding (DF) 
2) Signal acquisition 
3) Hostile Forces Integrated Targeting Service (HITS), 
4) Digital Receiver Technology (DRT) geolocation capability 
5) Integrated signal analysis and select National Security Agency 
(NSA) applications via the Cryptologic Unified Build (CUB) toolbox 
CVN, CG, DDG 
AN/USQ-172(V)10 
Global Command and 
Control System – 
Maritime (GCCS-M) 
Provides: 
1) Unit location and amplifying information 
2) Fuses, correlates, filters, maintains and displays location and 
attribute information on friendly, hostile and neutral land, sea and air 
forces, integrated with available intelligence and environmental 
information to develop Common Operational Picture (COP) 
3) Aides decision maker   
CVN, CG, DDG 
Distributed Common 
Ground System – 
Navy (DCGS-N) 
Provides: 
1) Integrates shared intelligence data, information and services between 
various intelligence and decision making entities 




System, Variant IV 
(NITES-IV) 
Provides: 
1) Operational and tactical METOC support to Navy, Marine Corps 
and Joint Forces engaged in worldwide operations, ashore and afloat 
2) Distributes gathered meteorological data 
CVN 
Table 2.   Air Defense Net-Centric Systems (After PEO C4I 2011). PEO Master 
Plan Version 5.0. San Diego: Program Executive Officer, Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence. 
It should be noted that while the systems chosen provide a good representative 
sample of those systems which may be used in air-defense operations, this list should by 
no means be considered exhaustive. The C4I Masterplan provides only system overviews 
and does not give detailed explanations of each system and its capabilities. In order to 
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correctly identify each relevant system, subject matter experts on each would need to be 
consulted and personnel familiar with the entire C4I portfolio would need to compile an 
exhaustive list. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to include these systems to 
validate our approach. 
Using these systems, we may now seek to capture the capabilities each one 
provides. This may be accomplished using a System Functionality Description. The next 
section will outline the process for developing this DoDAF viewpoint and how it will be 
used.  
G. SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY DESCRIPTION 
The DoD guidance on Architectural Framework Version 1.5, volume II, defines a 
SV-4a, System Functionality Description, as documenting system functional hierarchies 
and system functions and how data flows between them. This product is closely related to 
the OV-5 and, when used in conjunction with the SV-5a viewpoint, will provide a 
mapping to the operators and the systems they use. 
A SV-4a (Figure 4) is constructed by taking each of the systems identified as 
relevant to air defense operations and breaking them down to their provided functionality. 








Figure 4.   Conduct Air Defense SV-4a, System Functionality Description
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Having now identified the functionality each air-defense unit provides, we can 
link the system function to the operational tasks we previously identified. This is 
completed using an Operational Activities to Systems Functional Traceability Matrix and 
will be developed in the next section. 
H. LINKING OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES TO SYSTEMS FUNCTIONS 
TRACEABILITY MATRIX 
The DoD guidance in Architectural Framework Version 1.5, Volume II, defines a 
SV-5a (Figure 5) as documenting the relationship between the operational activities and 
system functionality present in the overall architecture. It is this relationship that is most 
beneficial for the purpose of this thesis. 
By identifying the systems being utilized by operators to complete assigned 
tasking, it is possible to document those systems which are most relevant to the 
overarching task at hand. Given their usefulness, these systems are the ones which should 
be given priority over other networked systems in a bandwidth constrained environment. 
Our methodology provides a logical justification for giving priority to one system over 
another and demonstrates a step-by-step process by which justification for the 
prioritization of networked systems may be derived. This methodology can be recreated 
depending on the mission at hand to develop the correct network prioritization based on 
mission needs.  
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NTA 5 -  Exercise Command and Control
NTA 5.1 - Acquire, Process, Communicate Information 
and Status
NTA 5.2 - Analyze and Assess Situation
NTA 5.4 - Direct, Lead, and Coordinate Forces
NTA 6 - Protect the Force
NTA 6.1 - Enhance Survivability
NTA 6.1.1 - Protect Against Combat Area Hazards
NTA 6.5 - Perform Consequence Management
NTA 2 - Develop Intelligence
NTA 2.1 - Plan and Direct Intelligence Operations
NTA 2.2 - Perform Collection Operations and 
Management
NTA 2.3 - Process and Exploit Collected Information and 
Intelligence
NTA 2.4 - Conduct Analysis and Produce Intelligence
NTA 2.5 - Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence
NTA 2.6 - Evaluate Intelligence Operations
NTA 5.5 - Conduct Information Warfare (IW)
NTA 6.1.1.3 - Positively Identify Friendly Forces
NTA 3 - Employ Firepower
NTA 6.5.2 - Coordinate Damage Control Operations
NTA 3.1 - Process Targets
NTA 3.2 - Attack Targets
NTA 2.2.1 - Collect Target Information
NTA 3.2.7 - Intercept, Engage, and Neutralize Enemy 
Aircraft and Missile Targets (Defensive Counter Air)
NTA 2.2.3 - Perform Tactical Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance
NTA 3.2.5 - Conduct Electronic Attack
NTA 5.5.4 - Conduct Electronic Warfare Support (ES)























































































































































































































































































































































































 The X’s on the SV-5a indicate those systems which are being used by an operator 
to complete a task. For now, only those systems which connect to the Global Information 
Grid (GIG) via an Internet Protocol (IP) pipeline have been mapped. As new systems are 
fielded to be deployed on CANES, this diagram would need to grow to encompass them. 
The dashed area indicates that those systems identified that are not currently available for 
those users. 
 ADNS currently recognizes 54 separate application types (Automated Digital 
Network System, 2011). These applications are spread over four classification levels—
Top Secret, Secret, Unclassified, and Coalition—and one network overhead 
classification. Each of these applications is mapped to one of 13 separate named queues. 
Using the Capabilities-based Competency Assessment (CBCA) developed in this chapter, 
we can map the applications ADNS recognizes to those systems identified as being 
important to our mission, air defense operations (Table 3).  
System Name Application Types 
SSEE INC E/F 
Time Sync, Chat, COP, HFDF 
E-mail, CERCIS, OS/BS, PARA 126, 
TDDS 
Name Resolution, Encryption, File 
Transfer, Web, Secure Web, Remote 
Access, Targeting PSAS 
EVCP, Big Brother, ISRT 
GCCS-N 
GCCS-M NETPREC, Critical E-
mail/Web 
DCGS-N 
High Priority Applications 
NITES-IV 
Table 3.   Mapping System Names to Application Types 
 Each information system has now been linked to the task associated with its use 
and each task has been linked to the operator who completes that task. Our proposed 
prioritization scheme will place each of the identified systems at the top of the priority 
scheme. A detailed comparison of the current priority scheme and our proposal will be 
outlined in the Chapter VI, but first we will define an environment in which to test the 
effectiveness of our proposal. 
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IV. AIR DETECT-TO-ENGAGE SCENARIO 
To vet the effectiveness of increased flexibility in bandwidth allocation, a typical 
air detect-to-engage (DTE) scenario will be developed. This scenario will be used to 
compare the time effects of the proposed bandwidth allocation scheme, based on 
operational tasks and warfighter information needs, to the static bandwidth allocation 
scheme inherent to ADNS INC III. 
First, an operational environment must be chosen and defined for the scenario. 
Next, an initial force laydown for the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) will be established. 
Finally, a threat will be chosen and deployed against the CSG. The scenario will then 
progress through the incremental stages of the air DTE sequence, ultimately culminating 
in an engagement of the threat by friendly forces. This scenario will be simulated using 
both methods of bandwidth allocation and comparisons will be drawn in terms of time 
and effectiveness. 
A. THE ENVIRONMENT 
Throughout history, most naval combat has taken place close to the shore versus 
the open ocean (Vego, 2007). The reason for this is rooted in Mahan’s theory of naval 
operations, namely the purpose of a nation’s navy is the protection of its commercial 
interests. Commercial shipping is linked to a nation’s ports, which lay on the nation’s 
coast. This idea, coupled with the need for the Navy to be able to project power inland, 
has pushed the emphasis of Naval strategy toward the littoral – i.e., close to shore –
environment. In 2007, the Navy, Marine Corp, and Coast Guard published the first ever 
joint strategic document entitled, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. 
This document outlines the need to maintain the capability to project power ashore as 
well as support for forces once ashore. Integral to this strategy are operations within the 
littoral environment. For this reason, a representative littoral environment will act as the 
theater for the scenario. 
A fictional littoral area of approximately 250 x 350 nautical miles in dimension 
will serve as the operating area for the carrier strike group (CSG). The environment 
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consists of the fictional country Gray’s coastline, including its capital, Capital City, and 
another large coastal city, Graytown (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6.   CSG Operating Environment  
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B. FORCE LAYDOWN 
The CSG is deployed approximately 150 miles from the coastline of country 
Gray. This placement allows time for any potential threats to the CSG to progress 
through the various concentric air defense zones of the strike group – denoted by the 
Range Rings in Figure 3. These air defense zones are defined as follows: 
 Vital Area (VA)—the VA is defined as the area which extends from the high-
value unit (HVU) to the maximum range of enemy weapons which may be 
employed against the HVU. Based on the threat which will be evaluated, the 
VA is centered on the aircraft carrier and extends out to a radius of 20 nautical 
miles. 
 Classify Identify and Engage Area (CIEA)—the CIEA is defined as the area 
which extends to the maximum range of friendly weapons that may be 
employed against hostile targets. It is so named because the goal of the air 
defense team is to classify and identify all potential threats in this area and, if 
warranted, engage hostile enemy units prior to their arrival in the VA. The 
primary surface-to-air weapon of the U.S. fleet is the Standard SM-2 MR, 
RIM-66C missile (Polmar, 2005). The SM-2 has a maximum range in the 
vicinity of 80 nautical miles and will serve as the delineator of the CIEA’s 
range. While technically the CIEA morphs to accommodate the force 
laydown, with each air defense unit having a CIEA based on its own weapons 
range, this would unnecessarily complicate the battle problem. As long as 
consistency is maintained between the two simulations, the CIEA may be 
simplified and centered on the HVU. 
 Surveillance Area (SA)—the SA is defined as the area which extends to the 
maximum detection range of the CSG’s sensors. In this case, there are three 
AEGIS warships, equipped with the SPY-1 radar system, which has a 
detection range in the order of 200 nautical miles (Polmar, 2005). While 
identification and classification of potential targets operating in this area is not 
crucial, it is desirable to do so in preparation for their entry into the CIEA. 
Similar to the CIEA, the SA changes with the force laydown but will be 
modified to be centered on the HVU and extend out to a range of 200 nautical 
miles. 
The notional force consists of one Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyer 
(DDG) positioned 100 nautical miles (nm) west of the HVU, a second Arleigh Burke 
Class DDG positioned 25 nm west of the HVU, and a Ticonderoga Class CG positioned 
10 nm to the southeast of the HVU. 
While typically multiple Defensive Combat Air (DCA) units would be deployed 
for the protection of the strike group, the purpose of this scenario is to evaluate the 
 48 
effectiveness of shipboard systems and operators based on a proposed bandwidth 
prioritization scheme. DCA would normally act as the primary means to engage potential 
threats against the CSG, but using them in this capacity may introduce unnecessary 
variations in the scenario results. For this reason, DCA deployment will not be 
considered in this scenario.  
C. THE THREAT 
The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom was introduced to the U.S. military in 1958 
and began to be sold internationally by 1964. Production continued form 1958 to 1979, 
with a total of 5,195 aircraft constructed. Although retired by the U.S. in 1996 there are 
still more than 800 F-4 Phantom IIs active in eight air forces worldwide and the aircraft 
will most likely remain in service until at least 2015 (F-4 Phantoms Phabulous 40th). The 
F-4 was designed to carry up to 16,000 lbs. of external armaments and provided multi-
role capability including long range attack and is equipped with look-down/shoot-down 
capability (McDonell Douglas F-4D, 2009). Given its long history of service, wide 
dissemination, and capabilities as an attack aircraft, the F-4 Phantom will serve as the 
threat aircraft for this scenario. 
According to the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force website, the basic 
characteristics of the F-4 are as follows: 
Manufacturer: McDonnell Douglas 
Armament: Up to 16,000 lbs. external conventional/nuclear bombs, rockets, 
missiles or 20mm cannon 
Propulsion: Two General Electric J-79-GE-15s of 17,000 lbs. thrust, each with 
afterburner 
Altitude: Up to 40,000 ft. 
Speed: 1,178 knots at 35,000 ft.  
Radius: 250 nm 
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The CHETA C-801/CSS-N-4 SARDINE is a Chinese developed anti-ship cruise 
missile believed to be developed from the French EXOCET (Pike, 2011). The C-801, and 
several of its derivatives, has been successfully launched from fighter aircraft, including 
the F-4. The missile has been successfully tested against and sunk a test target ship with a 
displacement of 10,000 tons. Equipped with a 165 kg high explosive, semi-armor 
piercing warhead, maximum effective range in excess of 40 km, and an anti-jamming 
terminal guidance system, the C-801 missile continues to be a viable threat to U.S. forces 
operating in littoral environments. For this reason, the C-801 will serve as the threat 
missile against the force. 
The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems provides the 
following characteristics for the C-801: 
Manufacturer: CHETA—China Hai Yang [Sea Eagle] Electro-Mechanical 
Technology 
 Armament: 167 kg, semi-armor piercing warhead 
 Propulsion: Boost-sustain rocket (two motors) 
 Altitude: Cruise: 20–30 meters; Attack: 5—7 meters 
 Speed: 0.9 mach (595 knots) 
 Radius: Approximately 40 km 
D. THE SCENARIO 
The operational scenario will consist of three phases: surveillance, escalation, 
engagement. The purpose of each of these phases will be to simulate likely operating 
conditions and threat and warning conditions, and to determine the effectiveness of 
dynamic bandwidth allocation. 
1. Surveillance Phase 
During this phase, the ships in the operating environment will conduct normal 
operations inherent to underway steaming. This phase of the scenario will last thirty 
minutes to provide ample time for the network to reach steady-state operations and to 
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provide a reasonable period of observation. In our model, it will be used to determine the 
time required for information to be transmitted off the different classes of ships to be 
relayed back to decision makers within the strike group. This will be accomplished using 
the settings inherent to ADNS INC III and the results will be used to gauge the 
effectiveness of the current settings. Upon conclusion of this phase, it will be assumed 
that the strike group commander will receive information of an impending attack on the 
CSG and will increase his air defense posture accordingly. 
2. Escalation Phase 
During this phase, the threat F-4 equipped with the C-801 missile will take off 
from Graytown and proceed northeast towards the HVU. It will climb to its cruising 
altitude and attempt to launch its weapon against the aircraft carrier at the earliest 
opportunity. 
The purpose of this phase will be to compare the difference in transmission times 
under the proposed prioritization scheme and the legacy settings and evaluate the impact 
on the human decision making process. This will require an assessment of not only 
statistical significance between the data sets but also practical significance in terms of the 
speed of human thought.  
During this phase, there will be an increase in network traffic associated with the 
identification of the F-4. Measurements of data latency and throughput will be recorded 
for each prioritization scheme, which will allow us to draw a contrast between the two. 
This phase will terminate once the F-4 has reached its earliest firing opportunity. 
3. Engagement Phase  
The final phase of this scenario will assume the F-4 has successfully transited the 
CIEA and deployed its weapon against the HVU. The purpose of this phase will be to 
evaluate the impact on the system decision making process. As technology increases, so 
too does our dependence on that technology. The AEGIS weapon system is capable of 
automatic deployment of weapon systems, given that a threat meets certain predefined 
parameters. Given this current capability, it is logical to conclude that as the force 
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becomes more and more net-centric, our weapon systems will evolve to encompass this 
capability. During this phase of the evaluation, human processing becomes less important 
and relatively small increases to network response times become more significant.  
Network traffic will again increase to simulate the escalation of the threat and 
measurements of latency and throughput recorded for comparison. This phase will 
terminate once the C-801 has transited inside the minimum engagement range of the 
carrier’s self-defense weapon systems. 
This scenario sets the stage for evaluating the effectiveness of our methodology 
for developing a bandwidth prioritization scheme. We have sought to capture its impact 
on not only the human decision makers but also the networked systems involved in the 
air defense process. The metrics gathered from running this scenario, namely latency and 
data throughput, will provide an effective yardstick for comparison. The next chapter is 
dedicated to the development of our model, representing the shipboard networks, which 
will be placed in this operating environment. This model represents current network 
capabilities and we can use it to evaluate both prioritization schemes.  
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V. QUALITY OF SERVICE MODEL 
A key tool for implementing Quality of Service (QoS) management for shipboard 
IP networks is marking IP packets using the type of service header (ToS) field within the 
IPv4 header. The Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) uses the first six bits 
within this octet to mark each packet with a Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) 
(Automated Digital Network System, 2011). These DSCP markings can be used to 
separate network traffic into class bins which can be used to implement separate controls 
in off-ship transmission. These traffic bins are General Service (GENSER)—the 
classification level, i.e., Unclassified, Secret, etc.—ignorant, meaning that even though 
Secret and Top Secret enclaves are physically separated and encrypted differently, the 
routing of those packets is done without regard for its GENSER level of classification. 
To test the effectiveness of a prioritization scheme in the current Navy 
environment we need to capture the DSCP process used by ADNS. A stochastic 
simulation was developed using the ExtendSim 8 software suite to model this process. 
Figure 7 provides a simplified rendering of the model’s construction and will be used to 
aid discussion of QoS implementation within ADNS. It is important to note that our 
simulation focuses on how prioritization schemes impact data throughput and latency 
within the context of the scenario developed in the previous chapter. We are not 
modeling the scenario itself, only using it to provide context for the expected data traffic 
within each phase of an air detect-to-engage (DTE) scenario. 
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Figure 7.   Flow Diagram Representation of ExtendSim 8 Model 
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ADNS separates network traffic into five separate Community of Interest (COI) 
local area networks (LANs). They are SECRET, TS-SCI, UNCLASS, CENTRIXS 
(coalition), and an additional classification for Cipher Text Core Traffic (Automated 
Digital Network System, 2011) and are shown on the left side of Figure 7. Each LAN is 
comprised of various IP-based network applications which are marked using the ToS 
header and are processed using either First-In, First-Out (FIFO) or Classed-based 
Weighted Fair Queuing (CBWFQ) queuing doctrine. These applications are listed within 
the Traffic Classes, Packet Marking and Priority Processing documentation provided by 
the Program Manager, Warfare (PMW) 160 Office. Each of the applications which 
comprise the COI LANs is represented in our model by a block that creates “packets” 
with inter-arrival times following a normal distribution. Mean inter-arrival time for each 
type of application varies depending on the type of service it performs (Table 4). 
 
Application Type Mean Inter-arrival Period Standard Deviation 
Video 33 ms 1 ms 
VoIP 100 ms 10 ms 
Data 200 ms 20 ms 
Network Overhead 50 ms 1 ms 
Table 4.   Application Type Inter-arrival Parameters 
These inter-arrival periods were modeled using a normal distribution, bounded by 
zero on the left side, with a standard deviation as indicated in Table 4. It should be noted 
that network traffic behavior does not typically adhere to normal distributions but may be 
classified as “bursty.” This means packet inter-arrival periods more closely follow a 
distribution which may be described as heavy-tailed. This is due in large part to the 
inherent randomness associated with voice and video applications and the fact that data 
applications are not used at a constant rate. While utilization of such a distribution would 
provide for more realistic network behavior, it would introduce a great deal of variability 
which is not directly related to the purpose of this study and it would have made 
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interpreting the results more complicated. We chose to simplify the analysis by using a 
normal distribution for the inter-arrival periods. Similarly, each packet produced is 
assumed to be 1,500 bytes in length; this assumes an absolutely “worst case” scenario in 
which every application is outputting the maximum amount of data possible. While the 
two simplifying assumptions introduced in our model would most likely not occur in 
real-life, they facilitate comparison of prioritization schemes and limit the number of 
independent variables in the model.   
Each of the packets generated in the simulation was marked with a priority based 
upon the type of information it is carrying. This marking allows for the packet to be 
routed to one of the fourteen separate queues as shown in Figure 7. ADNS currently 
specifies thirteen different queue types, based upon network application behavior 
(Automated Digital Network System, 2011). We introduce a fourteenth Mission Queue 
which is reserved for those applications deemed most relevant to air defense operations. 
The data from those relevant applications would be marked accordingly and routed to this 
separate queue. The additional queue is the simplest way to test the proposed 
prioritization scheme against the existing ADNS scheme. Actual implementation of the 
prioritization scheme by the Navy might differ based on network configuration and other 
considerations.   
The Voice over IP (VoIP) Low Latency Queues within ADNS receive a fixed 
amount of bandwidth, dependent upon the entire amount of bandwidth available on a 
particular transmission channel while the remaining queues share the entire available 
bandwidth on each channel. All other queues are guaranteed a minimum percentage of 
bandwidth. There are two divisions of queues within ADNS. For higher capacity 
pipelines—Super High Frequency (SHF) and Commercial Wideband Satellite Program 
(CWSP)—queues within the first division are assigned a percentage of the total amount 
of bandwidth available and that percentage is then parsed out to each application within 
that group based on an assigned schedule, while queues within the second division are 




bandwidth pipelines—Extremely High Frequency (EHF) and International Maritime 
Satellite Program (INMARSAT)—bandwidth percentages assigned are based on the total 
amount of bandwidth available regardless of grouping. 
The model is designed to incorporate only those bandwidth pipelines available to a 
particular class of ship. Thus, CVNs will be allowed the CWSP, SHF and EHF pipelines, 
and DDGs and CGs will be allowed the SHF, EHF and INMARSAT pipelines. The 
model works to balance the load between each of the transmission pipelines available to 
each queue type as shown in Figure 7. Each bandwidth pipeline will delay the 
progression of packets by a period equal to the amount of time it would take to transmit 
that packet. For example, if the EHF pipeline is capable of handling 1.544 Mbps, we will 
assume one half is reserved for download, leaving us 722 kbps to handle the upload of 
data. There is no VoIP traffic handled by EHF so we do not need to subtract from it the 
amount reserved for VoIP. If we wanted to transmit one packet—1,500 bytes—of an 
application assigned to a queue that has been given 30% of the total bandwidth available 
for transmission, we would multiply the total bandwidth available by the percentage 
assigned yielding 231.6 kbps. This means that that this particular queue is capable of 
handling 231,600 bits of traffic per second. There are 8 bits to a byte, therefore a 1,500 
byte Ethernet packet is 12,000 bits in length. Dividing this value by the total transmission 
speed yields a result of 51.8 ms, or the amount of time the model must delay the packet 
before transmission. This methodology is applied to each pipeline and used to accurately 
model the network behavior. This behavior is dynamic, meaning that if a particular queue 
is not using its bandwidth at that time step, it will give it up. The model checks each time 
step to see which queues require bandwidth and which do not. It will first subtract from 
the total amount of bandwidth available that amount which has been assigned to the 
queues which currently require it and will parse out the remaining bandwidth following 
the same percentage assignment schedule as outlined in the Traffic Classes, Packet 
Marking and Priority Processing documentation provided by the PMW 160 Office. 
ADNS uses two methods for the queuing doctrine applied to each queue. First, 
applications which are weighted equally within the same queue are handled by a FIFO 
methodology. Second, applications which are weighted differently, though routed to the 
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same queue, are handled using CBWFQ with Weighted Random Early Detection 
(WRED). CBWFQ allows for routing of those packets with a higher priority at the 
expense of those with a lower priority. This is accomplished by randomly dropping lower 
priority packets, once a queue has reached a pre-determined length. 
Beginning at the minimum queue length threshold, packets are dropped following a 
linear schedule, until the maximum queue length threshold is reached and at which point 
the maximum percentage of packets dropped is reached. Once the maximum queue 
length threshold is exceeded, the percentage of packets dropped for an application goes to 
100% and all traffic from that application is blocked until the queue length drops below 
the minimum threshold (Automated Digital Network System, 2011). In our model, this is 
accomplished by sampling the current queue length for each time step. If the sampled 
queue length falls within the set boundaries, packets are dropped according to scheduled 
packet drop probability. Assume for example a queue’s minimum length threshold is 20 
packets and its maximum queue length threshold is 30 packets. Also assume that at the 
maximum queue length threshold ten percent of all packets originated by that application 
type will be dropped. Once this maximum threshold length is exceeded, all traffic will be 
dropped. Prior to the queue’s length reaching 20 packets, all traffic will be transmitted 
normally. Once the queue length reaches 20 packets, one percent of the packets generated 
by that application will be dropped; at 21 packets, two percent will be dropped and so on 
up to the maximum queue length. If a packet is dropped, instead of being routed to the 
traffic class queue, it is rerouted to a separate activity where it will be delayed the 
equivalent of one time step. After this delay, it will try the queue length again to see if it 
falls within the set boundaries or whether it needs to be delayed again. 
Within ADNS, this random dropping denies the originating application a receipt 
acknowledgment by the router and forces the application to retransmit the packet. As 
more and more packets are randomly dropped, the originating application slows down its 
rate of transmission to compensate, allowing for higher priority applications to transmit at 
a faster rate (Automated Digital Network System, 2011). In our model, this metric is 
captured by measuring the amount of packets that actually were transmitted and 
comparing that value to the amount of packets that were created. This gives a percentage 
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of actual throughput and will be used as a measure to compare the effectiveness of a 
given priority scheme as it applies to mission specific applications. 
If a queue is not using its assigned bandwidth, the bandwidth will be allocated to 
the other queues to use until it is needed by the originally assigned queue. This allocation 
is done proportional to the minimum bandwidth assigned each queue (Automated Digital 
Network System, 2011). The remaining bandwidth is reserved for traffic bursts and 
default traffic. The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) queuing is based on application 
priority, thus all High Priority UDP traffic will be processed before any Medium Priority 
UDP traffic and so on. 
Having modeled the behavior of ADNS, we are now ready to test the effectiveness 
of each bandwidth management scheme using the scenario we defined in Chapter IV. The 
following chapter will outline the results of our analysis and provide insights into the 
data.   
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VI.  RESULTS 
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CBCA PRIORITY SCHEME 
Using the mapping developed in Chapter III, it is now possible to implement our 
Capabilities-based Competency Assessment (CBCA) prioritization scheme. In order to 
capture the CBCA priority in our model, a separate queue was developed and each 
application type that was relevant to our mission was sent to that queue. This queue was 
then assigned a percentage of available bandwidth comparable to other queues handling 
similar data types, the difference being the volume of traffic assigned to our “mission 
queue.”  
B. SCENARIO RESULTS 
To implement the three separate phases of the scenario, as defined in Chapter IV, 
and to stress the model, we varied the amount of network traffic generated by each 
relevant application.  
During the first phase, the Surveillance Phase, all network traffic remained at 
default levels. This phase was conducted over a 30 minute period to simulate normal air-
defense operations without the presence of a threat. Using the current settings of ADNS 
INC III, the latency and throughput percentage of our identified systems were recorded 
for both the carrier (CVN) and cruiser/destroyer (CRUDES) (Table 5). Latency refers to 
the timeliness of data. By recording latency, we gain an understanding of how long it 
takes for data to be created, routed and then transmitted. It is important because even if 
data is 100% complete, but arrives later than it is needed, it is of no use. Throughput 
refers to how much of the data created is actually transmitted in the time allowed. Acting 
as the other side of the coin to latency, it does no good for data to arrive instantaneously 
if it is insufficient to act upon. The latency and throughput results from our ADNS INC 
III model will act as a baseline for evaluation. Each of the application types that were 
identified as being relevant to air-defense operations in Chapter III (Table 3) is listed. We 
recorded the average percent throughput and latency (in milliseconds) for both the carrier 
(CVN) and the cruiser/destroyer (CRUDES) escorts over a total of 30 runs. 
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Table 5.   Selected Applications Statistics, Default ADNS Configuration of Systems  
The second phase of evaluation is the Escalation Phase. During this phase, it is 
anticipated that the strike group will receive indications of a pending attack on the high 
value unit (HVU). This phase will last from the time the threat F-4 takes off until it has 
crossed in the Vital Area (VA) as defined in Chapter IV. As a response to this threat, the 
strike group commander (BB) will most likely increase his threat warning posture to 
match the threat being presented. This brings the force to a higher state of readiness in 
preparation for a possible attack via the air. In order to support this condition, we propose 
the prioritization scheme shown in Table 6 be implemented, as it brings to the forefront 
those net-centric systems designed to aid anti-air warfare. By using our process, which 
links relevant tasks to the operators who must complete them and the systems they must 
use to do so, we have sought to capture a network prioritization scheme which truly 
emphasizes air-defense. The bandwidth percentages assigned to each queue were done in 
such a way as to minimize latency and maximize throughput of those systems we 
identified as relevant while trying to minimize the impact to those systems we identified 
as not as important to air-defense operations in Chapter III. It should be noted that the 
percentages we have assigned are notional and were selected based upon a desired 
outcome. Our process seeks to simplify the prioritization decision for commanders based 










CVN 1.0000 11.122 1.0000 11.207 1.0000 27.778










CVN 1.0000 27.917 1.0000 27.879 1.0000 27.894
CRUDES 0.3467 110280.414 0.3445 109629.028 0.3427 110423.471
High Priority Applications GCCS-M, NETPREC Time Sync, Chat, COP, HFDF 
Email, CERCIS, OS/BD, 
PARA126, TDDS
Name Resolution, Encryption, 
File Transfer, Web, Secure Web 
EVCP, Big Brother, ISRT
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Table 6.   CBCA Bandwidth Allocation Scheme – Escalation Phase 
The queues listed on the left side of Table 6 are those currently utilized with the 
Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) (Automated Digital Network System, 
2011). We have added the Mission queue to the default queue listing and have applied a 
separate percentage of available bandwidth to it in order to implement our prioritization 
scheme. The four columns present in Table 6 represent the four transmission paths 
available to our strike group ships: Commercial Wideband Satellite Program (CWSP)—
CVN only, Super High Frequency (SHF), Extremely High Frequency (EHF), and 
International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT)—CRUDES only (Automated Digital 
Network System, 2011). The values in each block represent the percentage of bandwidth 
available on each transmission path, i.e., column, applied to each queue, i.e., row, with 
the exception of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) which is a flat amount.  
CWSP SHF EHF INMARSAT
Group 1 33% 19% N/A N/A
CEM 15% 25% N/A N/A
VTC 12% 12% N/A N/A
JCA 18% 12% N/A N/A
SECRET (CBWFQ1) 12% 7% 27% 17%
UNCLAS (CBWFQ2) 6% 4% 12% 7%
CENTRIXS (CBWFQ3) 6% 4% 12% 4%
SCI (CBWFQ4) 13% 5% 17% 14%
Other
VoIP (LLQ) 384 kbps 384 kbps N/A 57 kbps
PQ (FMV) 10% 10% N/A N/A
UDP N/A N/A 10% N/A
USSOCOM 24% 24% N/A N/A
CT Net (CONTROL) 1% 1% 2% 2%
OAM/Default 11% 25% 5% 41%
Mission 21% 21% 15% 15%
Escalation Phase
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In order to simulate the increase in threat and to further stress the model, the 
output of our selected applications was effectively doubled. This is based on the 
assumption that the traffic output of those applications deemed relevant to air defense 
would increase due to the now present threat and the information being gathered about it. 
This phase of the scenario was simulated over thirty runs and the average latency and 
throughput was recorded as shown in Figures 8 through 11. The values along the y-axis 
in Figures 8 and 10 are milliseconds. The average time to transmit each data type for each 
prioritization scheme has been recorded for comparison. The values along the y-axis in 
Figure 9 and 11 are percentages. The average percentage throughput for each data type 
for each prioritization scheme has been recorded for comparison.  
 
 














































































































Figure 9.   Comparison of Aircraft Carrier Percent Throughput (Escalation Phase) 
 




























































































































































































































Figure 11.   Comparison of Cruiser/Destroyer Percent Throughput (Escalation Phase) 
Upon visual inspection, Figures 8 and 10 show marked decreases in the 
application latency associated with our prioritization schemes—meaning important 
mission data is being transmitted faster—while Figures 9 and 11 demonstrate at a 
minimum consistent data throughput and in most cases a significant increase – meaning 
more important mission data is being transmitted. The difference in the means of the two 
prioritization schemes was analyzed using an unpaired Student’s t-test and found to be 
statistically significant (see Appendix). The simulation indicates a consistent or even 
increased amount of relevant air-defense information getting through in less time using 
our prioritization scheme versus the default ADNS prioritization scheme. This is 
important because information is not only being transmitted faster; it is also being 
transmitted correctly with greater throughput. 
The third phase of evaluation is the Terminal Phase. During this phase, it is 
assumed that the inbound threat will have fired its weapon at the High Value Unit 
(HVU), prompting BB to further escalate the strike group’s readiness posture. This phase 
will last from the time the threat F-4 has crossed into the VA, fired its weapon (C-801), 













































































































Cruiser/Destroyer Percent Throughput 
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In order to support this condition of readiness, we propose the following prioritization 
scheme (Table 7) be implemented, as it puts even further emphasis on those net-centric 
systems designed to aid anti-air warfare. As was done previously, the bandwidth 
percentages assigned to each queue were done in such a way as to minimize latency and 
maximize throughput of those systems we deemed relevant while trying to minimize the 
impact to those systems we deemed not as important to air-defense operations. The 
bandwidth percentages selected during this phase reflect the increased amount of air-
defense relevant network traffic. Again, it should be noted that the percentages we have 
assigned here were done so to obtain a desired outcome. The actual percentages of 
bandwidth to be assigned each queue would need to be assigned based upon the 
commander’s priority and intent. 
 
 
Table 7.   CBCA Bandwidth Allocation Scheme – Terminal Phase 
CWSP SHF EHF INMARSAT
Group 1 30% 15% N/A N/A
CEM 15% 25% N/A N/A
VTC 12% 12% N/A N/A
JCA 18% 12% N/A N/A
SECRET (CBWFQ1) 12% 7% 25% 15%
UNCLAS (CBWFQ2) 6% 4% 11% 7%
CENTRIXS (CBWFQ3) 6% 4% 10% 4%
SCI (CBWFQ4) 13% 5% 15% 13%
Other
VoIP (LLQ) 384 kbps 384 kbps N/A 57 kbps
PQ (FMV) 10% 10% N/A N/A
UDP N/A N/A 10% N/A
USSOCOM 22% 22% N/A N/A
CT Net (CONTROL) 1% 1% 2% 2%
OAM/Default 10% 25% 5% 37%
Mission 27% 27% 22% 22%
Terminal Phase
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In order to simulate this final phase and to further stress the model, the output of 
our selected applications was again effectively doubled—now four times the initial value. 
This is based on the assumption that the traffic output of those applications deemed 
relevant to air defense would increase due to the now present threat F-4 and the inbound 
threat missile. The results of this phase of the scenario are presented below (Figures 12—
15). 
 












































































































Figure 13.   Comparison of Aircraft Carrier Percent Throughput (Terminal Phase) 
 






























































































































































































































Figure 15.   Comparison of Cruiser/Destroyer Percent Throughput (Terminal Phase) 
The results shown in Figures 12 and 14 again indicate statistically significant (see 
Appendix) decreases in data latency associated with our prioritization scheme while 
Figures 13 and 15 show statistically significant increases in percentage of data 
throughput—meaning more relevant information is getting through in less time and that 
information is more complete.  
C. IMPACT OF PROPOSED PRIORITIZATION SCHEME 
To understand the importance of our prioritization scheme, we must examine the 
impact of time delays in the context of air defense—a key question is whether or not the 
differences noted in the previous section are practically significant. One of the primary 
reasons for the selection of this particular warfare area is that time is often at a premium. 
The C-801 missile was chosen due to its widespread proliferation, but it is by no means 
the most sophisticated of threats faced by our modern navy; however, it is sufficient to 
demonstrate the effect of our prioritization scheme. 
We will examine the time savings for the CRUDES class ships during the 
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scheme saves on average approximately 9s in time delays for our selected applications as 
compared to the default ADNS prioritization scheme. In order to understand the 
importance of this time savings, it is beneficial to consider the weapon being used. From 
Chapter IV, we know the cruising speed of a C-801 is 595 knots. Using the formulas for 
time distance (Equation 1) we see the actual distance the missile may travel in this 
allotted time is almost one and a half nautical miles.  
(1) 
(0.165 )(9 ) 1.486
d vt




So ultimately, what does the time/distance savings buy us? As the Navy becomes 
more and more net-centric, our dependency on these systems to “fight the ship”—
meaning the actual warfighting for which that ship is designed—will increase. It is 
reasonable to assume that the end goal of this net-centric approach to warfare is to 
develop a completely integrated, networked, system-of-systems designed to maximize 
warfighter capability. To this end, all shipboard systems will be used in the identification 
and prosecution of hostile targets. The amplifying information these systems provide will 
be aggregated to provide superior targeting information and reduce our dependency on 
just one or two sensors to make positive target identifications. Every millisecond we save 
in the transmission of data results in increased ranges at which may engage hostile 
targets. This means more time for human decision makers to draw conclusions and more 
opportunities for us to put ordnance on target. 
In their book, Human Factors in Simple and Complex Systems, Proctor and Van 
Zandt (2008) define a reaction-time task as that which requires a person to respond to a 
stimulus as quickly as possible. They highlight three types of reaction-time tasks: simple 
reaction time, go-no go reaction time, and choice reaction time (Proctor & Van Zandt, 
2008). In simple reaction time tasks, users must react solely at the presence of a stimulus. 
In go-no go reaction time, users must discern between the presence of one stimulus 
versus another. The example they provide is responding to the presence of the letter A but 
no the presence of letter B. In choice reaction time, the user must discern among different 
responses, each dependent upon the stimulus received. To continue with the previous 
example, the letter A would prompt one response while the letter B would prompt 
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another. They go on to highlight recent work conducted in continuous information 
accumulation. According to this behavioral model, human information processing is 
conducted in parallel, meaning that each stage of the information process is not discrete 
but that information is rather processed like water moving through a sponge (Proctor & 
Van Zandt, 2008). This model suggests that as information is received, the brain may 
begin processing of that information, prompting a response before the actual response is 
made. This prompting may lead to errors as operators attempt to respond as quickly as 
possible to the given stimuli. They may reach the wrong conclusion if their minimum 
processing threshold is set too low in order to decrease their response time. Proctor and 
Van Zandt argue that this model is the only one which explains the relationship between 
human response time and accuracy. They cite as observation that the fastest possible 
human reaction to simple reaction time tasks is 150 ms for visual stimuli. This reaction 
time slows linearly, following a log2 scale, with the number of possible stimuli and 
responses available to the operator. 
If we assume the previously described mean reaction time, we see that the time 
savings described in this paper are within the threshold of human reaction. This is critical 
as it allows for an actual physical response by a human operator. The more the latency of 
our selected data is reduced, the more time the human decision maker has to react to the 
visual stimulus. This impact is even more drastic as we consider the near instantaneous 
reaction time of automated systems. For example, assume a human operator must choose 
between ten separate alternative responses to the given stimuli. According to the research 
conducted by William Hick, reaction time increases as a logarithmic function of the 




Reaction time (s) = Log
Number of stimuli, 10







This means that more than 3 seconds will elapse before a reasonable human response 
may be expected. Machines are not limited by this delay and the response to stimuli will 
be nearly instantaneous—assuming some reasonable threshold of stimuli—with the only 
delay being the time it takes for information to reach the computer system. While at some 
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point, the amount of processing required would exceed the capacity of a computer, the 
amount of information present in an air defense environment is insufficient to overwhelm 
current computer systems. Again using the formulas for time distance (Equation 3): 
 
(3)   
(0.165 / )(3.322 ) 0.548
d vt





We see that by removing the human decision maker from the equation we can expect 
marked increases in the distance at which a hostile target may be engaged.  
 Additionally, the C-801 was chosen as the hostile target in this scenario due to its 
wide proliferation, not necessarily its capability. More and more sophisticated anti-ship 
missiles are being fielded with cruising velocities exceeding multiples of Mach 1. Given 
an autonomous response capability, milliseconds saved in transmission time can directly 
translate to whether an enemy target may be destroyed in the allotted time or if it will 
strike its intended target. 
 In this chapter we have presented results of our network simulations for an air 
detect-to-engage (DTE) sequence comparing default ADNS network prioritization and 
our CBCA-based methodology for network prioritization. The results of our analysis 
indicated marked network performance increases using our CBCA-based process. Our 
evaluation took place over three separate phases of an air detect-to-engage (DTE) in 
which we sought to simulate ADNS network response to an increasing threat. During the 
first phase (Surveillance Phase) we established a base network performance measure for 
ADNS which was used to gauge the effectiveness of existing network prioritization. The 
next two phases (Escalation Phase and Terminal Phase) were dedicated to examining the 
impact of our prioritization methodology on the network response to the emerging threat 
and comparing it to the current prioritization methodology implemented within ADNS. A 
summary of these results (Table 8), in which the average latency (in milliseconds) and 
percent throughput for all network applications were recorded and compared, has been 
included for clarification purposes. 
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Table 8.   Comparison of Average Latency and Throughput for Standard and CBCA 
Network Prioritization 
 It should be noted that the values shown in Table 8 are merely averages of all air 
defense network applications. The individual values for each application type and 
evidence of statistical significance are presented in the Appedix. Our results indicated 
consistent reduction in network latency and increased throughput for network 
applications we identified as being relevant to air defense operations when using our 
prioritization methodology. These network improvements translate directly to improved 




CVN CRUDES CVN CRUDES
Average Latency (Standard) 24.772 113811.943 981.396 15291.243
Average Latency (CBCA) 4.863 37056.427 4.386 7624.121
Percent Reduction in Latency -80.37% -67.44% -99.55% -50.14%
Average Percent Throughput (Standard) 99.998% 39.032% 98.234% 27.771%
Average Percent Throughput (CBCA) 99.999% 70.209% 99.995% 54.990%
Percent Increase in Throughput 0.0009% 14.6147% 1.7553% 4.4879%




This document sought to answer two questions: 
1) What is the feasibility of developing a bandwidth utilization priority scheme 
based upon identified tasks and information required by warfighters to conduct 
military operations within a hostile environment? 
2) How will this systematic allocation process, based upon warfighter information 
needs and dynamically tailored for various threats, affect data latency and 
information throughput? 
We have demonstrated a process which seeks to properly align system prioritization with 
operator needs based upon mission tasking. Such a methodology works by linking 
operational tasking to warfighters, working within a command infrastructure, and 
identifying those systems used by those warfighters to accomplish said tasking. Our work 
may be seen as a guideline for the development of network prioritization schemes which 
seek to optimize Navy networks for combat and are in keeping with the philosophy of 
net-centric warfare (NCW). Ideally, strike group commanders would leverage our 
approach to facilitate communication between the technical and tactical personnel under 
their command and develop an intimate understanding of their networks as true weapon 
systems. Such an understanding allows for commanders to optimize the network assets at 
their disposal and bring to the forefront those network systems relevant to the mission-at-
hand.  
The information we have presented in this study makes the case for competency-
based network prioritization based on the needs of the warfighter. This is not to say that 
network application characteristics should not be taken into account, only that they 
should not be the only force which drives network prioritization.  
Through modeling and simulation, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of our 
bandwidth prioritization on reducing relevant data latency and increasing information 
throughput. Doing so allows for longer dwell times for human and machine responses to  
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the threat environment and translates into information dominance. Our process provides a 
tool for commanders to develop pre-planned responses for network prioritization, just as 
they would for any other weapon system at their disposal. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
We believe it would be highly beneficial to expand our network model. We have 
shown the effectiveness of our prioritization scheme in processing information for a 
single ship, but a model which encompasses not only the relationships of onboard 
systems, but the relationships between ships within the strike group and the Internet at 
large would be valuable. Our model sought to mimic the stochastic processes inherent to 
network behavior; however a higher resolution model which incorporates Department of 
Defense (DoD) specific applications may be of great use. Additionally we have made 
several simplifying assumptions, namely in the assumption of normality in the underlying 
distribution of packet inter-arrival periods as well as the size of all network packets. In 
order to truly model network behavior, more realistic assumptions would need to be 
made. True packet inter-arrival rates conform to a distribution which is more heavy-tailed 
and there is a great deal of variability associated with packet size. The inherent 
“burstiness” of network traffic introduces a great deal of variability and increases the risk 
of critical information not being received in time. In order to determine the effectiveness 
of our prioritization scheme in limiting this risk, evaluations of our model using these 
type of assumptions will have to be performed. 
Additional research should be conducted on the implementation of identified 
processes and technologies for dynamic Quality of Service (QoS) within the DoD 
environment. While technological advances have been made in this area of research, 
further efforts will be required before solutions may be implemented for warfighter use. 
Real-time simulation of dynamic bandwidth allocation, utilizing some of the identified 
processes, in a real-world scenario would no doubt provide much insight into the 
applicability of new technologies in NCW. 
Finally, our process was designed to provide an outline for how a capability-based 
network prioritization scheme should be developed. The example we have provided 
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serves only to demonstrate our method and should not be taken at face value. Any 
prioritization scheme that is truly tailored for warfighter optimization should be 
originated and vetted by the technical and tactical experts it is designed to augment.   
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APPENDIX 
This appendix contains the results of the independent two-sample, single-tailed 
Student t-tests conducted to confirm statistical significance between recorded results for 
each phase of our model. The mean latency and percent throughput, and the associated 
standard deviations (based on 30 runs), were recorded for both the default ADNS settings 
as well as our CBCA Recommended Settings as presented in Chapter VI, Tables 6 and 7 
(Tables 9 and 10). 
 
Table 9.   Comparison of Average Latency and Percent Throughput for Selected 
Applications, Standard ADNS Settings vs. CBCA Settings (CARRIER).   
APPLICATION NAME PHASE AVERAGE VALUE (ms) VARIANCE (ms2) AVERAGE VALUE VARIANCE
Escalation 11.563 0.049 1.000 0.000
Terminal 12.340 0.199 1.000 0.000
Escalation 11.795 0.196 1.000 0.000
Terminal 12.382 0.114 1.000 0.000
Escalation 30.834 0.760 1.000 0.000
Terminal 1468.693 69685.262 0.973 0.000
Escalation 32.783 1.419 1.000 0.000
Terminal 1446.886 73660.365 0.973 0.000
Escalation 30.956 0.556 1.000 0.000
Terminal 1478.850 87447.835 0.974 0.000
Escalation 30.698 0.444 1.000 0.000
Terminal 1469.226 90779.519 0.974 0.000
Escalation 4.863 0.008 1.000 0.000
Terminal 4.381 0.011 1.000 0.000
Escalation 4.863 0.007 1.000 0.000
Terminal 4.370 0.011 1.000 0.000
Escalation 4.869 0.008 1.000 0.000
Terminal 4.371 0.015 1.000 0.000
Escalation 4.855 0.008 1.000 0.000
Terminal 4.369 0.010 1.000 0.000
Escalation 4.868 0.009 1.000 0.000
Terminal 4.400 0.015 1.000 0.000
Escalation 4.863 0.008 1.000 0.000







Time Sync, Chat, Cop, HFDF
Email, CERCIS, OS/BD, 
PARA126, TDDS
Name Resolution, Encryption, 
File Transfer, Web, Secure Web
EVCP, Big Brother, ISRT
Email, CERCIS, OS/BD, 
PARA126, TDDS
Name Resolution, Encryption, 
File Transfer, Web, Secure Web
EVCP, Big Brother, ISRT





Table 10.   Comparison of Average Latency and Percent Throughput for Selected 
Applications, Standard ADNS Settings vs. CBCA Settings (CRUDES). 
These results may be used to conduct statistical analysis. The first step in the 
determination of the statistical significance of our results is the development of the 
correct hypothesis test for comparison of the mean values of our model results. There are 
two parts to hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis (Ho)—which in this case will be the 
assumption that the mean values of our test populations are not statistically different – 
and the alternative hypothesis (Ha)—which in this case will be the assumption that the 
mean values of our test populations are statistically different.  
  
APPLICATION NAME PHASE AVERAGE VALUE (ms) VARIANCE (ms2) AVERAGE VALUE VARIANCE
Escalation 88310.839 4603663.159 0.713 0.000
Terminal 14136.054 198908.455 0.546 0.000
Escalation 100479.722 8851334.897 0.687 0.000
Terminal 14030.140 221936.916 0.546 0.000
Escalation 123889.406 5005164.206 0.235 0.000
Terminal 15840.933 544548.019 0.144 0.000
Escalation 123398.811 3793578.564 0.235 0.000
Terminal 16030.951 585599.966 0.142 0.000
Escalation 123693.960 5802303.837 0.236 0.000
Terminal 15867.789 527594.057 0.144 0.000
Escalation 123098.919 5670824.102 0.236 0.000
Terminal 15841.591 670709.971 0.144 0.000
Escalation 37217.901 2958803.686 0.701 0.000
Terminal 6306.229 374775.609 0.550 0.000
Escalation 37140.539 3293858.849 0.702 0.000
Terminal 6067.029 447836.757 0.551 0.000
Escalation 37827.175 2394056.060 0.700 0.000
Terminal 6250.266 365535.722 0.546 0.000
Escalation 36629.429 3646216.929 0.704 0.000
Terminal 6240.466 288647.262 0.552 0.000
Escalation 36915.146 3335255.969 0.703 0.000
Terminal 6095.606 251524.111 0.551 0.000
Escalation 36608.370 2895832.627 0.702 0.000







Time Sync, Chat, Cop, HFDF
Email, CERCIS, OS/BD, 
PARA126, TDDS
Name Resolution, Encryption, 
File Transfer, Web, Secure Web
EVCP, Big Brother, ISRT
Email, CERCIS, OS/BD, 
PARA126, TDDS
Name Resolution, Encryption, 
File Transfer, Web, Secure Web
EVCP, Big Brother, ISRT




The independent two-sample Student t-test is defined as follows: 
(4)   
1 2 1 2
2 2
2 2 1 2
1 2
















Where 1X  is equal to the mean of the first sample and 2X  is equal to the mean of the 
second sample, 21xs  is equal to the variance of the first sample and 
2
2xs  is equal to the 
variance of the second sample and n is equal to the size of the both the first and second 
samples (Hayter, 2007). This test assumes that both samples consist of the same number 
of observations, in our case 30, and that the distributions of both populations have an 
equal variance. The resulting t-value (tobsv) is then compared to known critical t-values 
(tcrit) from a t-distribution table and, depending upon the results, there will either be 
sufficient evidence to reject Ho—meaning the means of our populations are statistically 
different – or there is insufficient evidence to reject Ho—meaning we must conclude that 
the mean values of the two populations are not statistically different.  
When looking up the tcrit for the given conditions, one must determine the 
applicable degrees of freedom (ν) and assume a threshold of statistical significance (α). In 
this test, ν is defined as 2 2n where n is the number of observations in each group, 
resulting in a value of 58. Typically in hypothesis testing of this type, an α value of 0.05 
is used. A single-tailed t-distribution is used when one is trying to prove that a 
population’s mean value is either higher (right-side of the distribution) or lower (left-side 
of the distribution) than another population’s mean, not just different. Because we are 
only interested in results which will confirm decreases in data latency and increases in 
information throughput, a single-tailed test was used to compare the means of each 
population. Using the defined parameters for ν and α yields a tcrit of 1.672. This value is 
positive when using the right-side of the distribution and negative when using the left-
side of the distribution. If the absolute value of tobsv is greater than the absolute value of 
tcrit then there is sufficient evidence to reject Ho. 
For our purposes, we will assume the first population consists of the results from 
the default ADNS settings and the second population consists of the results from our 
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recommended CBCA settings. Therefore, when testing for the statistical significance of 
data latency, our alternative hypothesis will be that mean value of the first population is 
greater than that of the second population, and when testing for the statistical significance 
of percent throughput, our alternative hypothesis will be that the mean value of the first 
population is less than that of the second population. The null hypothesis for both 
comparisons of latency and percent throughput will be that the means of the populations 
are not different. The results of our hypothesis testing are presented below (Tables 11—
14). 
 
Table 11.   CARRIER Latency Hypothesis Test Results 
 
Table 12.   CRUDES Latency Hypothesis Test Results 
APPLICATION NAME PHASE Ho Ha t obsv t crit Reject Ho
Escalation 153.023 1.672 Yes
Terminal 95.038 1.672 Yes
Escalation 84.214 1.672 Yes
Terminal 123.864 1.672 Yes
Escalation 162.315 1.672 Yes
Terminal 30.383 1.672 Yes
Escalation 128.046 1.672 Yes
Terminal 29.111 1.672 Yes
Escalation 190.009 1.672 Yes
Terminal 27.310 1.672 Yes
Escalation 210.461 1.672 Yes










EVCP, Big Brother, 
ISRT
CARRIER LATENCY HYPOTHESIS TEST
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
APPLICATION NAME PHASE Ho Ha t obsv t crit Reject Ho
Escalation 101.763 1.672 Yes
Terminal 56.621 1.672 Yes
Escalation 99.548 1.672 Yes
Terminal 53.294 1.672 Yes
Escalation 173.293 1.672 Yes
Terminal 55.064 1.672 Yes
Escalation 174.240 1.672 Yes
Terminal 57.352 1.672 Yes
Escalation 157.239 1.672 Yes
Terminal 60.639 1.672 Yes
Escalation 161.854 1.672 Yes
Terminal 51.898 1.672 Yes











CRUDES LATENCY HYPOTHESIS TEST
              
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 83 
 
Table 13.   CARRIER Throughput Hypothesis Test Results 
 
Table 14.   CRUDES Throughput Hypothesis Test Results 
From these results, it is evident that there is a statistically significant decrease in 
the average latency associated with each of the selected applications using our 
prioritization methodology as compared to default ADNS settings. These results also 
indicate statistically significant increases in throughput using our prioritization scheme 
for most applications; however there is no significant difference for some applications. 
We note decreases in percent throughput for the High Priority Applications data types for 
both the CARRIER and CRUDES type ships during the Escalation Phase as well as 
GCCS-M, NETPREC data types for the CARRIER during the Escalation Phase when 
using our prioritization scheme. This decrease in percent throughput is offset by marked 
decreases in associated latency which should be taken into consideration when 
implementing our process for network prioritization. 
APPLICATION NAME PHASE Ho Ha t obsv t crit Reject Ho
Escalation 1.015 -1.672 No
Terminal -1.172 -1.672 No
Escalation 0.448 -1.672 No
Terminal -0.685 -1.672 No
Escalation -3.247 -1.672 Yes
Terminal -21.000 -1.672 Yes
Escalation -1.206 -1.672 No
Terminal -22.156 -1.672 Yes
Escalation -3.808 -1.672 Yes
Terminal -21.693 -1.672 Yes
Escalation -2.424 -1.672 Yes





EVCP, Big Brother, 
ISRT




Time Sync, Chat, 
Cop, HFDF
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
APPLICATION NAME PHASE Ho Ha t obsv t crit Reject Ho
Escalation 8.063 -1.672 No
Terminal -1.514 -1.672 No
Escalation -9.655 -1.672 Yes
Terminal -1.472 -1.672 No
Escalation -427.218 -1.672 Yes
Terminal -158.074 -1.672 Yes
Escalation -445.372 -1.672 Yes
Terminal -158.543 -1.672 Yes
Escalation -387.054 -1.672 Yes
Terminal -169.129 -1.672 Yes
Escalation -373.809 -1.672 Yes
Terminal -160.739 -1.672 Yes
GCCS-M, NETPREC






EVCP, Big Brother, 
ISRT
CRUDES THROUGHPUT HYPOTHESIS TEST
High Priority 
Applications
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